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ABSTRACT 
 
CAUGHT IN SOVEREIGNTY: A TURKISH REMEDY TO THE INEFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES ON COMBATING TERRORISM 
 
MERVE KÜÇÜK 
 
M.A. Thesis, July 2017 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Meltem Müftüler Baç 
 
Keywords: European Union, Counter-Terrorism, Islamic State, Jihadist Terrorism 
Following the two world wars, the formation of security policy in Europe was shaped by 
the security threats that it confronted throughout the history. During the Cold War era, the 
threat was the evil of communism created by the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the world became much closer and globalized. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, 
the nature of security threat has changed, and terrorism has emerged as the most important 
security threat for the world and Europe. 
Religiously inspired terrorism hit Europe first in 2004 with the Madrid bombings and then 
in 2005 with the London bombings. Following these attacks, the European Union security 
policy was framed to combat terrorism. Although the European Union created the European 
Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005 to fight against terrorism, the EU policies 
remain ineffective due to the reluctance of member states to make concession on security 
issues.  
This master thesis focuses on the Turkish role and power as a remedy to the ineffective 
counter-terrorism policies of the European Union. The frame of this thesis is formed on the 
historical and theoretical explanations which will reveal Turkey as a sustainable ally to 
Europe in combatting religiously inspired terrorism, i.e. Islamic State. Due to the 
convergence of material interests between Europe and Turkey, which has strategic 
importance for and experience in combating terrorism for many years, the relationship 
between the two parties will become much more interdependent in terms of achieving the 
common objective: fight against terrorism.  
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ÖZET 
 
EGEMENLİK SARMALI: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN TERÖRLE MÜCADELE 
POLİTİKALARINDAKI BAŞARISIZLIĞINA ÇÖZÜM OLARAK TÜRKİYE 
 
MERVE KÜÇÜK 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2017 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Terörle Mücadele, Irak-Şam İslam Devleti, Cihatçı 
Terör 
İki dünya savaşının ardından, Avrupa’daki güvenlik politikasının oluşumu, kıtanın tarih 
boyunca karşılaştığı tehditler tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Soğuk Savaş döneminde, tehdit 
Sovyetler Birliği tarafından yaratılan komünizm tehlikesiydi. Sovyetler Birliği’nin 
dağılmasından sonra dünya daha yakınlaştı ve küreselleşti. 2001’deki 11 Eylül saldırısından 
sonra, güvenlik tehdidinin doğası değişti ve terörizm dünya ve Avrupa için en önemli 
güvenlik sorunu olarak öne çıktı.  
Din temelli terörizm Avrupa’yı ilk olarak 2004’te Madrid Saldırısı ile daha sonra da 
2005’te Londra Saldırısı ile vurdu. Bu saldırıların akabinde, Avrupa Birliği’nin güvenlik 
politikası terörle mücadele çerçevesine alındı. Avrupa Birliği’nin 2005 yılında Avrupa 
Birliği Terörle Mücadele Stratejisi’ni ortaya çıkarmasına rağmen, AB politikaları üye 
devletlerin güvenlik konularında kendilerinden taviz vermeye çekinmelerinden ötürü 
başarısız kalmaktadır. 
Bu yüksek lisans tezi Avrupa Birliği’nin başarısız terörle mücadele politikalarına çözüm 
olarak Türkiye’nin rolü ve gücüne odaklanmaktadır. Bu tezin çerçevesi, Türkiye’yi, 
Avrupa’nın IŞİD gibi din temelli terörizmle mücadelesinde sürdürülebilir bir müttefiki 
olarak ortaya çıkaran tarihsel ve teorik açıklamalar üzerine şekillendirilmiştir. Avrupa ve 
terörle mücadelede stratejik öneme ve uzun yıllara dayanan tecrübeye sahip olan Türkiye 
arasındaki somut çıkarların kesişmesinden ötürü, ortak amaç olan terörle mücadeleyi 
gerçekleştirme açısından, iki taraf arasındaki ilişki birbirine daha bağımlı hale gelecektir. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror… 
Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature… America and our 
friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, 
and we stand together to win the war against terrorism”  
said President George W. Bush on the evening of September 11, 2001 (Bush, 2001).  
The world was shaken by the news of terrorist attacks targeting World Trade Center 
in the US by the morning of September 11, 2001. This is a milestone in the history of 
terrorism altering the mindset of people regarding what constitutes a terrorist activity and 
terrorist group. In the 21st century, terrorism has become the most terrifying security threat 
to the globalized world. 
With the turn of the new century, globalization has become influential in every aspect 
of the human life. It has eased the information dissemination and made people aware and 
informed about the world thanks to developments in technology. An increase in the level of 
trade has been observed which makes the world much closer in economic terms. In the 
globalized world, international security in the conventional sense is ensured given the fact 
that the possibility of war between nation states has been eliminated with the exception of 
intrastate wars. However, it is a commonly held the idea that for each and every single 
concept which is regarded as positive, there is a negative side to it as well. Beside of the 
virtues that globalization has brought to the human life, it has also changed the meaning of 
security and sources of security threats. The crimes such as terrorism, organized crime, 
smuggling of human beings, trafficking in arms, illicit drug trafficking, and cyber-crimes 
have become the new threats for the world. Therefore, the attention has been given to 
minimize these threats in order to maintain international security and peace in the world. To 
this end, both international organizations and sovereign states have started to cooperate 
with each other to fight with these threats.  
Among these threats, terrorism has gained the utmost priority after the 9/11 attacks in 
the US. This unfortunate incident became the turning point for the world’s terrorism history 
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since its scope and results were shocking. As CNN declares ‘At the World Trade Center 
(WTC) site in Lower Manhattan, 2,753 people were killed when hijacked American 
Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were intentionally crashed into the north 
and south towers or as a result of the crashes’ (CNN, 2016). Besides psychological effects 
that the attacks created on the US citizens, according to Carter and Cox’s research it cost 
$3.3 trillion to US government to recover the damages (Carter and Cox, 2011, NYTimes). 
The attacks were immediately associated with the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda although 
Al-Qaeda did not claim responsibility for the attacks at the first stage. In 2004, the leader of 
Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the attacks through a videotape by 
saying that ‘We should destroy towers in America because we are a free people... and we 
want to regain the freedom of our nation’ (CBC news, 2004). In response to the attacks, the 
United States of America notably started the fight against terrorism together with the 
Western part of the world. This can be shown in the words of President Bush on the 
evening of the attacks. He stated ‘America and our friends and allies join with all those who 
want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against 
terrorism’ (Bush, 2001). As a result of the attacks, War on Terror started in the Middle East 
in the leadership of the US in order to defeat terrorists and prevent future terrorist activities. 
In fighting against terrorism, the US government has been supported by its Western allies 
including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Being a supporter of the US, the 
European Union immediately condemned the attacks. Guy Verhofstadt, former prime 
minister of Belgium, expressed “deep shock and dismay” on hearing of the attacks.  He said 
‘On behalf of the European Union, [we] condemn in the strongest possible terms this type 
of cowardly attack on innocent civilians’ (as cited in CNN, 2011).  
The 9/11 attacks have long term consequences on the perception of terrorism and on 
the military actions and policies adopted by nation states and international organizations in 
order to combat terrorism. First of all, the 9/11 attacks changed the perception of the 
terrorism and terrorist groups. The mindset of the Americans about the terrorism and Islam 
has changed and this incident has an impact on the policies of states and international 
organization to combat terrorism. Islam started to be associated with terrorism which led to 
the emergence of Islamophobia in the West, particularly in the US. Since the 9/11 attacks, 
Muslims have been referred to as prone to violence, easy to radicalize and to be irrational.  
 3 
Furthermore, with the 9/11 attacks in the US, the difference between old and new terrorism 
became much more explicit. In order to better understand the debate about old vs. new 
terrorism, it is needed to define terrorism in the first place. Terrorism entered into the 
European language during the French Revolution of 1789. Terrorism referred to state 
terrorism which means acts of a government to create a fear among its population. 
Although every nation has defined what constitutes a terrorist act in a different way, this is 
not an easy task in the international area because of the disagreements about the definition 
of terrorism and anti-terrorism policies. In the broadest term, terrorism can be defined as 
the use of violence by a group to create a fear for the realization of a purpose. In 
international law, agreed legal meaning of terrorism is:  
“any action… that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians 
or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is 
to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (UN, 2004, pp.51). 
The reason for distinguishing new terrorism from the old one is that the features of 
terrorism have evolved throughout the time. The characteristic of old terrorism manifested 
itself in the years between the 1960s and 1980s. In those years, terrorism included either 
right or left wing terrorists or ethnonational separatists. Terrorists had primarily secular 
motivations and a rational political cause for their acts of terrorism. On the other hand, the 
new terrorism differs from the old terrorism in terms of actors, motivations, tactics, target 
groups, the scope of activity and reactions given to any attack. Primarily, the most salient 
characteristic of the new terrorism is the motivation for terrorists to use violence. Contrary 
to the old terrorism, the new terrorism does not have secular motivation. Indeed, the 
underlying cause for terrorists is religion, notably radical Islam. Being reluctant to any sort 
of negotiation, the terrorists radically believe their reason to demand any change. 
Therefore, the target group differs from the old terrorism including civilian population. 
This unselective violence of new terrorism creates greater fear in the society. As the 
technology develops in the 90s with the globalization, the weapons used for terror attacks 
can reach broader scope and cause greater damage both physically and psychologically. It 
can be argued that this kind of terrorism has started in the mid-90s with the bombing of 
World Trade Center in 1993 and it manifests itself evidently in the 9/11 attacks in 2001 in 
the US. Being an exact example of new terrorism, the 9/11 attacks were coordinated by a 
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radical Islamist terrorist group, Al-Qaeda. As it can be observed from the information 
provided above, the attacks and the outcomes terrified the world and thus the reaction was 
large-scale including many world powers led by the US and the UK to fight against 
terrorism. Therefore, another difference between old and new terrorism can be described as 
the perception of terrorist groups and the reaction given to any attack. In the 60s and 80s, 
the separatists were considered as terrorist groups such as IRA, ETA etc. However, there 
were also some recognizing these people as freedom fighters who use selective violence for 
a political change. Therefore, once there is an attack, this is considered more of a national 
problem of that country since the attack is coming inside of the country. Moreover, 
separatism, as a political problem, is not in consideration of other countries since such kind 
of an attack does not pose any threat to another country and to the world. However, the 
situation is not the same with the new terrorism. The threat becomes much more enormous 
and sudden since the motivation is different in the new type of terrorism. Therefore, 
sovereign states cannot ignore this problem by considering this as a matter of one nation 
state. Furthermore, the danger is so immense that one sovereign state cannot possibly find a 
way out to fight against terrorism. Because of these reasons, fight against the new terrorism 
would necessitate the cooperation and collaboration at the international level. To this end, 
the United Nations took the first step as the largest international organization. As it is 
declared in the official website of the UN, ‘the attacks against the United States on 11 
September 2001 prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1373, which for the 
first time established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)’ (un.org). The main 
principle of the committee and the other consecutive bodies of the UN is to ‘to enhance the 
capacity of Member States to prevent and respond to terrorist acts’ (un.org). Besides the 
US’s War on Terror and, the international community has been an active actor to combat 
terrorism since 9/11 attacks.  
It is historically well-known fact that not only the United States of America was the 
victim of terrorist attacks but the European countries have also suffered from terrorism 
threat for many years. Both the old and the new terrorist attacks happened in Europe. 
However, they differ in terms of time, effect and scope of the attack. Once the old terrorism 
hit the European states, it did not create reactions at the supranational i.e. the Community 
level due to several reasons. First of all, it can be argued that Europe was not entirely 
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unified politically and economically when terrorism was threat for the European countries. 
Indeed, it was in the process of deepening and widening in the 60s and 80s so it could not 
act jointly. Secondly, the root causes of the attacks which were ethnonationalism and 
separatism prevented Europe since perception of terrorism threat was not large enough to 
prompt Europe to find a common solution. Thirdly, even if Europe wished to act together, 
the European Economic Community (EEC) lacked any sort of mechanism to do so since it 
was established in order to prevent any war among European states through enhancement 
of economic relations. Because of these reasons, old terrorism did not get attention at the 
Community level and the European states had to deal with the problem themselves. 
However, the perception of the terrorism has changed throughout the time so did the 
European capabilities and its institutional form. Once the Al-Qaeda organized horrible 
attacks in the US in 2001, Europe has already created a union which has supranational 
institutions and decision-making power. The 9/11 attacks were so unexpected and the 
results of it were so terrifying that it created the sensation that it may also happen anytime 
and anywhere in Europe. Therefore, one of the purposes of any terrorist attack which is to 
create fear was realized in Europe after the 9/11 attacks. In fact, Europe’s fears came true in 
Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. The attacks have continued in Europe although 
actors have changed with the time. Radical Islam increasingly continues recruitment and 
organizing its attacks in Europe. In response to that, Europe has sought to stand together 
and prevent the terrorist attacks. To this end, the European Union formalized a strategy to 
combat terrorism in 2005 after the Madrid and London bombings. Since 2005 the European 
Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, the European Union has endeavored to strengthen the 
Member States’ capabilities, to prevent any terrorist attack, to further cooperation both at 
the supranational and intergovernmental levels in order to combat terrorism. Despite all of 
the endeavors, the European Union could not prevent further terrorist activities from 
occurring on its continent. 2015 November Paris bombings and 2016 March Brussels 
bombings are the illustrations of the incapability of the European Union in the fight against 
terrorism. The recent Jihadist attacks in Europe demonstrate the role and power of the 
Republic of Turkey in fighting terrorism. 
In this context, the objective of this thesis is to draw attention to the new threat for 
Europe which is posed by Jihadist terrorism and to revitalize deteriorating relationship 
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between the European Union and Turkey as to cooperate in combating terrorism. In order 
to achieve these objectives, the thesis will be built upon three research questions. First of 
all, the question of ‘To what extent are the European Union policies effective?’ will be 
answered. Secondly, ‘To what extent can the European Union responses to terrorism be 
explained by the theoretical perspectives: inter-governmentalism vs. neo-functionalism?’ 
will be addressed. Lastly, the question of ‘To what extent the European Union and Turkey 
cooperate in order to combat terrorism?’ will be examined. The thesis will describe and 
explain the European Union policies to combat terrorism within the limited scope which 
includes the European Union security policies since its establishment until today. The 
individual member states’ policy formation to combat terrorism will be beyond the scope of 
this thesis.   
To realize the objectives within this scope, the thesis is composed of six chapters 
including Introduction and Conclusions. The Introduction draws attention to the emergence 
of the new terrorism threat which differs in many aspects from the old terrorism. The 
second chapter titled as Security Considerations in European Economic 
Community/European Union from the post-World War II to post-Cold War Era will focus 
on the security considerations in Europe with the clear historical background. Firstly, this 
chapter will provide information on how World War I and World War II shaped the 
international security structure. Furthermore, the conjuncture in which Europe tried to unite 
and integrate itself after two world wars will be pointed out. This chapter will also present 
and examine in detail the security considerations of the EEC/EU from the establishment of 
the European Defense Community to formation of the Common Security and Defense 
Policy together with historical developments that triggered the policy formation in the 
European Union.  
Chapter 3 titled as Change in Security Threats for the European Economic 
Community/European Union will analyze the changes in security threats for the EEC/EU 
before and after the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, it will examine the policies and strategies 
adopted by the European Union before and after the 9/11 attacks in order to combat 
terrorism so that the significance of the 9/11 will be illustrated in altering the mindset of 
Europe in regard to terrorism and terror policies. This chapter will select two important 
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terrorist attacks in Europe which are the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 
respectively as a case study in order to explain the danger in Europe and concerns of the 
European Union. In the light of this information, this chapter will elaborate on the 
European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2005 as a response to the Madrid 
and London bombings. 
Chapter 4, Ineffectiveness of European Union Policy Formation in regard to 
Terrorism, will provide briefly critical analysis on the European Union policies regarding 
terrorism by presenting the current literature about the subject matter. As an illustration of 
this inefficacy, another case study will be carried out which will analyze two further 
incidents in details: the Paris and Brussels bombings realized in 2015 and 2016 
respectively. In addition to these bombings, the recent terrorist attacks organized in 
different parts of Europe will be examined. The European Union responses to these attacks 
will be analyzed together with the world reactions. After this analysis, the European 
Union’s security policy formation will be studied in the theoretical framework of neo-
functionalism and inter-governmentalism.  
Chapter 5 entitled as Turkey’s Place in the European Union Security Consideration 
will give place to Turkey’s role in the EEC/EU’s security considerations by presenting a 
brief historical analysis of the relationship between the European Union and Turkey. 
Furthermore, Turkish power in NATO-EU cooperation will be touched upon. After 
explaining the importance of Brussels bombings in 2016 which illustrates the fundamental 
role of Turkey in Europe’s security, Turkey will be asserted as a sustainable ally for the 
European Union particularly in combating terrorism. This chapter will be finalized by 
examining the relationship between Turkey and the European Union within the perspective 
of rationalist and utilitarian model. 
Finally, Conclusions will summarize the main findings of this research and submit 
the concluding remarks. The thesis will be finalized by further recommendation on related 
research areas for the literature.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY/THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM THE POST-WORLD WAR I TO 
THE 21st CENTURY 
 
“World War I was the most colossal, murderous, mismanaged butchery that has 
ever taken place on earth. Any writer who said otherwise lied, so the writers 
either wrote propaganda, shut up, or fought”  
said Ernest Hemingway demonstrating the horrors of the World War I (Hemingway, 
1929).  
The war was called Great War since it was the first war that included most of the 
powers in the world which were Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Empire as 
Central Powers; France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan as Allies (Smith, 2015).  The world 
witnessed such a war that caused millions of casualties which were estimated as ‘17 million 
people killed including soldiers and civilians’ (BBC, 2014). The war devastated the world 
economically as well. It is claimed that ‘By 1914, Europe had won the respect of the world 
as a reliable money-lender, yet just four years later was greatly in debt to her allies for their 
generous financial contributions toward the war effort, owing them as much as $10 billion’ 
(Karpilovsky et. al).  In such a catastrophic atmosphere, the one and only objective of the 
world states was to ensure the peace in the world and to recover the countries both 
economically and psychologically. To this end, ‘By December 1920, 48 states had signed 
the League Covenant, pledging to work together to eliminate aggression between countries’ 
and established the League of Nations (Townshend, 2011). The leadership of the United 
States of America and the fourteen points of Woodrow Wilson was essentials of this 
foundation even though the US did not prefer become a member of the League. The core 
purposes of the League were to ensure the collective security and disarmament in the 
world. Hence, since the end of the World War I, ensuring the international security has 
been one of the key objectives upon which the world states have placed importance. 
However, newly emerged conjuncture did not allow the world to live in a peace. The 
League of Nations could not maintain disarmament and prevent power struggle in Europe. 
On the one hand, Germany had become one of the most powerful countries in Europe and 
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asked for revenge of World War I. In order to compensate the losses of the Great War, 
Germany started to rebuild its army and prepared the country for a new war. On the other 
hand, France was willing to curb the power of Germany any way that it saw possible. As a 
result of unceasing desires of the countries, unsuccessful leadership, power struggle and 
ineffectiveness of the League, the world witnessed the Second World War.  The results 
were terrifying for the world. Similar to World War I, it ended up with the loss of lives; and 
devastated the economies of many states. The Second World War caused even more 
causalities than the World War I. According to Fraser Cameron ‘It was the greatest and 
deadliest war in human history, with over 57 million lives lost’ (Cameron, 2014).  
After living through two unspeakable world wars, immediate aim was to guarantee 
the peace in the world. The states were sick and tired of fighting one another and thus they 
were willing to eliminate the wars and to ensure international security. In order to achieve 
this aim, the United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 when the Charter was 
ratified by the five permanent members namely, China, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union at the time (History of the United Nations, un.org). 
Contrary to its predecessor, the United Nations has been able to preserve its existence while 
expanding and developing. In the beginning, the United Nations had 51 members; today in 
2017, it has 193 member states. The purposes of the United Nations are described in its 
Charter. Chapter I, Article I of the UN Charter defines the UN’s purposes as  
“to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples; to achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character; to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment 
of these common ends” (UN Charter, art. 1). 
After the Second World War, international security was maintained thanks to the 
international organizations and to the states which were reluctant to witness any world war. 
The immediate need for the states was economic recovery after the war. Being destroyed 
too much by the war, European countries needed an outside help in order to compensate 
their losses. The United States of America became part of an effort for the amelioration of 
the European economy through its Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. The speech given 
by President Marshall in June 1947 clearly guaranteed the US assistance to Europe and 
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suggested also that Europe must itself seek for recovery. President Marshall declares in his 
speech:  
“It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to 
draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet 
economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, 
must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid 
in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so 
far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, 
agreed to by a number, if not all European nations” (Marshall, 1947). 
Besides being supported by the US financially, European politicians and bureaucrats 
looked for the European ways to create an integration in which they could live in peace and 
hold together. There were different ideas and political design for Europe in different parts 
of the continent. First of all, after the war and establishment of the United Nations, the idea 
of federalism became very popular both in Europe and America. The movement for a 
federal unification of Europe was designated by Altiero Spinelli who was an Italian 
politician. Together with Ernesto Rossi, he wrote Ventontone Manifesto in which he 
defined an action plan for United States of Europe (Levi, 2009). Having considered 
federalism as a way for the European integration, he proposed the creation of supranational 
European federation of states which would prevent any war in Europe. The essential of 
Spinelli’s thoughts is that concept of nation state is the core cause of fascism and 
authoritarianism. While expressing Spinelli’s opinion on the nation state, Levi states that 
‘Ultimately, the cause of imperialism and war lies in state sovereignty and international 
anarchy. The more specific cause of imperialism in the era of the world wars is to be found 
in the crisis of the European system of states’ (Levi, 2009). Thus, the political design of 
Spinelli for Europe was the European Federation which would eliminate international 
anarchy and guarantee the peace. However, the conjuncture after the war was not 
appropriate for the creation of the European Federation. First of all, the antagonism 
between the nation states particularly between France and Germany were not totally 
eliminated so that national boundaries would be abandoned and thus a federation would be 
established. Furthermore, the high bureaucrats of the time were not favoring such 
establishment. 
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Second proposed idea to form European integration was based on the economic 
relationships between the Europeans so that there would be overlapping interests, which 
may prevent possible conflicts in the continent. Therefore, the aim was to establish an 
organization which was capable of controlling war materials such as coal and steel. To 
realize this objective, with the leadership of Jean Monnet, French bureaucrat, and Robert 
Schuman, French Foreign Minister, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was 
established in 1951 as the first European institution based on the principle of 
supranationalism which envisaged a creation of High Authority controlling the production 
of coal and steel. The European bureaucrats and politicians preferred the establishment of 
such organization as a way for the integration since it was the most conceivable path for the 
integration. First of all, contrary to the European Federation of Spinelli, the cooperation 
through the ECSC preserved the existence of nation states and of national sovereignty 
which the Europeans attached importance to it after the war. Secondly, for the European 
politicians of the time, the economy seemed most reasonable way to choose for integration 
since it was considered as low politics which made cooperation more doable and 
sustainable. The European states were more prone to make concessions on economic 
policies rather than on security and/or defense policies after the war because there was not 
enough feeling of trust between states to collaborate on security and defense policies. 
Furthermore, the common and concrete question to be dealt with urgently after the war was 
ameliorating the economy and ensuring the war. Therefore, establishing an organization 
controlling the economic production in certain sectors through the supranational institution, 
High Authority in the ECSC, was the most reasonable way to prefer for the European 
integration.  
Besides economic path for integration, another design for the European integration 
was the creation of the European Defense Community in 1950. The Community was 
introduced in 1950 and failed four years later because of the reasons that will be touched 
upon in details in the next section of this chapter. 
While having entered into a process of integration both economically and politically 
by the creation of the ECSC in 1951, Europe found itself in the Cold War as the rest of the 
world. When the Second World War was over in 1945, the balance of power changed and a 
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power vacuum emerged. In this conjuncture, the world was divided into two poles, West 
and East, because of ideological differences and power politics. On the west side, the 
United States of America was the superpower by influencing the Western part of the world. 
On the east side, the Soviet Union was the superpower as the opponent of the US. From 
time to time, the tension between the two blocks was accelerated and there was a possibility 
of the start of a nuclear war. Fortunately, no such war happened in the world during the 
Cold War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War ended leaving 
the United States of America the only superpower of the world at the time. The elimination 
of two poles brought about more integration to the world in the 90s while Europe was also 
endeavoring to improve its integration and cooperation in the areas other than the economy. 
In order to analyze better the security considerations in the European Economic 
Community/European Union, the European Defense Community as a proposed integration 
path needs to be examined while taking into consideration that the defense, security and 
foreign policy formation emerged different times and in different patterns in the European 
Union history.  
 
2.1. The European Defense Community and Its Failure 
The consequences of two world wars demonstrated to the Europeans that they could 
not manage their problems through the race of armament. For this reason, both world wars 
have a fundamental role in Europe’s future integration as Cameron states ‘without both 
World Wars there would be no European Union (EU) today’ (Cameron, 2014). Since this 
thesis will focus on the European Union’s policies to combat terrorism, it is needed to 
analyze first the security considerations for the EEC/EU since its establishment. The 
EEC/EU’s policies on security have been shaped by primarily the security threats that the 
countries confront and the countries’ willingness or reluctance to form security policies at 
the Community/Union level. In order to understand better the creation of security policies 
in accordance with the security threats, the European integration process after the war must 
be analyzed. After the war, immediate aim for the Europeans was to create a relationship 
that is capable of preventing any war between them. Since the aim was to prevent any war 
from occurring again, it was thought that the most reasonable way to realize this aim, as 
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explained above, was to create a community which would be based on economic 
relationships. Being one of the most crucial high politics issues, the security issues were 
preferred to be considered at the national level rather than the Community level because it 
was harder to reach common security interests for the countries, given the fact that they had 
recently fought a destructive war among each other on their continent. Being aware of this 
fact, the European politicians and bureaucrats decided to establish an economic community 
based on supranational principle. Six countries namely France, West Germany, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy established the ECSC in 1951 by Paris Treaty. This 
community was ‘based on the common market, common objectives and common 
institutions’ as reflected in the Article 1 of the Treaty (Treaty constituting the European 
Coal and Steel Community, 1951, Art 1). The Treaty included control of the production of 
only two war materials, coal and steel; equal access to the sources of production within the 
common market; promote the improvement of the living and working conditions of the 
labor force, under the High Authority (Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel 
Community, 1951, Art 3). The Paris Treaty outlined the objectives of the Community in the 
Article 2 as ‘to contribute to economic expansion, the development of employment and the 
improvement of the standard of living in the participating countries through the institution’ 
(Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951, Art2). Thanks to this 
treaty, integration for six European countries was ensured for a narrow part of the economic 
production in Europe. As it is summarized in the European Union’s website,  
“The overall achievements of the ECSC were positive. The Community was 
able to deal with crises, ensuring balanced development of the production and 
distribution of resources and facilitating the necessary industrial restructuring 
and redevelopment… The ECSC's systems of social management (early 
retirement, transitional allowances, mobility grants, training, etc.) were of great 
importance in dealing with crises” (Summaries of EU Legislation, eur-
lex.europa). 
This is the preferred and the most reasonable way for the European countries to 
realize their dream of integration, as clarified in the preceding section.  
However, for the sake of this thesis, another proposed idea for the European 
integration which was the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC) needs to be 
examined. This idea was initiated by René Pleven, French Premier at the time, in 1950 and 
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thus this plan is also known as the Pleven Plan which was defensive in nature proposing the 
creation of the European Defense Forces. The international conjuncture was an essential 
factor to be specified for this proposal since the United States of America encouraged the 
Europeans for involving in a military organization which would be under the command of 
NATO and would be capable of resisting the Soviet Union. In 1950, the Korean War broke 
out and the threat of Communism was explicit for the European countries. Indeed, during 
the Cold War, the most essential security threat for the European countries was the spread 
of Communism. Influenced by this structure and the war, the European countries had the 
need of rearmament to be ready to fight against Communism if it is necessary. 
Furthermore, the United States of America asked its European allies for rearmament of 
West Germany, given the fact that West Germany was prohibited from building an army 
after the war. Having bad experiences on this issue and having aimed to prevent the 
military possibility of West Germany’s making war again; France desired to establish a 
European army under the European Defense Community which was capable of controlling 
the armament of the European countries especially of West Germany. France recognized 
the need to establish a community which was based on collective security as Kunz argues 
‘Just as the Schuman Plan should guard against the economic possibility of Germany’s 
making war again, thus the Pleven plan is designed to prevent Germany’s military 
capability to making war again’ (Kunz, 1953). The another intention of this plan was to 
create pan-European defense force as opposed to West Germany’s proposed accession to 
NATO. French politicians were never in favor of Germany’s rearmament under the NATO 
and thus as opposed to Germany’s improving its power within the NATO, French 
recognized the European Defense Community as its own solution which could control 
Germany under a European institution. Therefore, a treaty was signed in 1952 but never 
ratified since the ratification was ironically rejected by the French Parliament itself in 1954. 
First of all, there were Gaullists in France who opposed the idea because they had fears 
about diminishing of France’s national sovereignty because of the supranational character 
of the EDC. Secondly, there were Communists who did not want the creation of such 
organization since they were not willing to be allied with the USA under such kind of a 
plan. The main idea was that as Arı states ‘The U.S. involvement in and supervision of the 
E.D.C. process was primarily due to economic and trade interests. Their primary aim was 
 15 
to create a stable Europe so that the U.S. private sector could operate and make business on 
the Continent’ (Arı, 2004). Moreover, there were others suspecting of West Germany’s 
remilitarization and fearing of rearmed and reunited Germany in the continent. The 
research demonstrating French Public opinion states that 57% of the French people 
believed that existence of military troops in Germany would create a danger to France (as 
cited in Arı, 2004). Furthermore, the plan lost its significance since with the death of 
Joseph Stalin in 1954 at the end of the Korean War; the threat of Communism was not as 
apparent as of 1950 which means that the threat was faded away. In a nutshell, both the 
internal dynamics of the French politics and the US pressure on the UK and France to 
accept German rearmament for the security reasons, the European Defense Community 
Treaty was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954. Hence, the European integration in 
the defense policy area withered in the wine in the first years of the EEC. However, this 
issue became at the top of the agenda in a different way in the European Union history after 
the end of the Cold War. As it is also understood from the failure of the European Defense 
Community, the European Union could not designate acceptable defense policy. However, 
changing international conjuncture and the deficiencies in the European Union institutions 
revealed the need to form common foreign and security policy, if not common defensive 
policy. 
 
2.2. Maastricht Treaty: Creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy 
As time progresses, the Europeans needed to widen their integration into other areas. 
One of the most significant areas of integration besides economy was foreign and security 
policy formation. The European politicians and bureaucrats needed to act jointly in their 
foreign matters. Before the Maastricht Treaty, which formalized the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) at the Union level, came into force in 1993, there was another 
attempt for foreign policy coordination in Europe. The European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) was introduced in 1970 after the failure of Fouchet Plan of Charles de Gaulle. In 
order to understand better the EPC, the first need is to examine briefly the Fouchet Plan. 
Having emphasized the French national sovereignty too much, the French President at the 
time, de Gaulle, had a grand design for Europe which favored the French power and 
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autonomy in the continent. In 1961, the plan was written by Christian Fouchet who was 
France’s ambassador to Denmark. It aimed to create common foreign policy and common 
defense policy while taking into consideration of member states’ preferences and interests 
and minimizing the role of the Commission. It was an alternative to the European 
Community which was based on supranational principles. Contrary to this, the Fouchet 
Plan adopted intergovernmental principles because of the concerns about loss of French 
national sovereignty in the European Community. However, the Benelux countries, 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, objected to the plan on the ground that this plan 
was against the idea of supranationalism and that the power of the Commission would have 
been weakened. Furthermore, there were fears among Benelux countries that de Gaulle 
would abuse the power, dominate the EEC and seek for national interests. Moreover, it was 
thought that the plan was opposed to NATO’s missions and directives, given the fact that 
France was not an Atlanticist state and intended to create European only defense policy. 
Hence, because of these reasons, the Fouchet Plan was never implemented in Europe and as 
a result of it de Gaulle’s grand design for Europe collapsed.  
Although the Fouchet Plan was unsuccessful, the European countries were still aware 
of the absence of a coherent foreign policy for the EC. That’s why the European Political 
Cooperation was introduced in 1970. A report was prepared by foreign ministers of 
member states on the problems of political unification, known as Davignon Report of 1970. 
Member states agreed to seek for political unification by cooperation and consultation at 
foreign policies through ministerial meetings. The report outlined two main objectives:  
“(a) To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of 
international politics, by exchanging information and .consulting regularly; 
(b) To increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, 
concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable” 
(1970, pp.10).  
Having these aims, the EPC sought for coherent foreign policy formation and being a 
single voice for Europe in foreign policies. The EPC was later empowered by Copenhagen 
Report of 1973. The members of the Community expressed their satisfaction caused by the 
cooperation and consultation in political area in the Copenhagen Report of 1973 (Part I, 
1973). In order for further cooperation, the member states decided to make improvements 
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within the frame of European Political Cooperation. The improvements included the 
ministerial meetings four times in a year, setting meeting in the Political Committee of the 
Member States of the European Community, creation of Group of Correspondents and 
Working Parties to ensure more consultation and to deal with problems, enlargement of the 
role of the embassies in the member states and third countries, set up of priorities to discuss 
and consult foreign policy questions to further political cooperation (Part II, 1973). In 
London Report of 1981, foreign ministers of member states emphasized increased political 
cooperation and the possibility of a single voice in foreign affairs (Part I, 1981). 
Furthermore, foreign ministers agreed to strengthen the organization, assure the continuity 
of political cooperation and increase the relations and consultation with the institutions of 
European Community such as the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Part 
II, 1981).  
In the European Community, the desire to have a common position in foreign affairs, 
to strengthen and to broaden the political cooperation areas became possible to be fulfilled 
when the Common Foreign and Security Policy was introduced in 1992 with the Maastricht 
Treaty which viewed the ‘European Political Cooperation as a guide’ (Treaty on the 
European Union, Final Act, 1992). The Maastricht Treaty, formally the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU), was signed by 12 member states in 1992 and established the 
European Union. The Treaty changed the structure of the European Community by forming 
the Union in Europe. It introduced the three pillars structure, namely European Community 
pillar (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar (CFSP), and Justice and Home 
Affairs pillar (JHA). While the first pillar was reserved for economic policies to be agreed 
at the community level and the third pillar was under the control of member states, the 
second level policy formation which was based on intergovernmental principles was 
possible through cooperation between member states and the EU institutions mainly the 
Commission. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy is the organized foreign policy formation 
for the Union’s external affairs, including only security and defense policies. The external 
economic relations are organized by the European Community Pillar. The objectives of the 
CFSP are outlined in Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty as: 
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“to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of 
the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all 
ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the principles of the United  Nations Charter as well as the principles of 
the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote 
international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, Art J.1, 
1992).  
As clearly seen from this article of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has 
sought to create the Union’s coherent and single voice foreign policy although the decision 
making in this critical issue area depends on unanimous voting in the Council of the 
European Union.  
In order to better manage and lead the policies, the European Union created a new 
post called High Representative under the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The High 
Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is responsible for the European 
Union Special Representatives and also is the president of the Foreign Affairs Council 
besides other tasks such as coordinating and carrying out the EU’s foreign policy. The first 
High Representative was Javier Solana who was former Secretary General of NATO. 
Currently, the post is held by Federica Mogherini, former Italian foreign minister. In spite 
of the fact that the role and power of the High Representative were limited initially, this 
was extended with the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The treaty changed the post’s name as the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Furthermore, it 
merged the External Relations Commissioner with the High Representative, enabling that 
only one person becomes responsible for the EU’s foreign policy. Therefore, the EU has 
seemed to answer the famous question of Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State of 
the USA: ‘Who do I call if I want to call Europe?’ (Brunnstorm, 2009) Thus, the answer 
given to the Kissinger’s question has become explicit since the Lisbon Treaty, which 
demonstrates significant turning point for the EU. The reason for this is that there had been 
complexities and debates before the Lisbon Treaty in the international area concerning who 
is responsible for conducting the EU’s foreign policy because there were many institutions 
and people who had a saying in foreign and security affairs. Furthermore, nation states and 
international organizations had problems with whom to apply when there is an issue on 
foreign affairs as the Kissinger’s question summarized this problem. With the reforms 
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made first by the Amsterdam Treaty and then by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union 
has acquired a single post called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. In this way, the EU has a ‘single voice’ in its foreign and security affairs in 
institutional level, which empowers the European Union in international area in a certain 
extent. However, the crises occurring in the continent demonstrates that the EU did not 
succeed in creating a single voice in its foreign and security affairs as it will be explained in 
the next section. 
 
2.3.  Saint-Malo Declaration for More Assertive European Foreign Policy 
In reality, did the European Union answer the Kissinger question by designating so-
called the EU foreign minister position? Institutionally, the answer may be given as ‘yes’ 
although there are other foreign representatives of the EU besides the High Representative. 
Even though the answer may be yes, another question arises: ‘To what extent does the 
establishment of the High Representative post improve the European Union’s foreign 
policy formation and its effectiveness in the international area?’  In order to answer this 
question, it is needed to examine the international conjuncture emerged in the post-Cold 
War era.  
Since the failure of the EDC in 1954, the European states have been genuinely in an 
effort to create a common foreign and security policy in order to ameliorate the power of 
the European Union in the international area. Even though having formalized and 
institutionalized this policy by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and developed it by the 
consecutive ones in ensuing years, the European Union has not been successful enough to 
response the international crises even in its own continent. The best example to 
demonstrate this reality is the Yugoslav Wars beginning in 1991 and lasting till 2001. The 
European Union clearly failed to resolve the conflicts and to prevent the genocide in 
Bosnia. It was not the EU and its CFSP, but NATO which brought peace on the European 
continent. It was argued that ‘Neither can one ignore the irony that as the European 
Community races toward unification; its increasingly wretched neighbors in the east and 
south face violent disintegration’ (Cohen, 1993).  One of the most important reasons for 
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this failure is that the three big European states, Germany, the UK, and France, were unable 
to agree among themselves about Yugoslavian disintegration. On the one hand, Germany 
supported Yugoslavian disintegration and favored the creation of independent of states 
Croatia and Slovenia in the region. Marolov claims ‘The German foreign policy was quite 
active in the field of providing support for Croatia and Slovenia from one hand and 
accusation for the outbreak of conflict to Serbia, on the other hand’ (Marolov, 2012).  On 
the other hand, Britain preferred to stay inactive since it viewed the war as Balkans’ 
problem, not one of Europe. Pond (2006) asserts ‘the UK had developed tactic by which an 
action by the West is not necessary because what was going on in Yugoslavia it would 
inevitably result in war between the Balkan “tribes” and finally with the creation of one 
hegemony (Serbian) which Britain would later easily handle’ (as cited in Marolov, 2012). 
Considering Serbia as an ally of itself, France opposed any argument that views Serbia as 
guilty of the war. Marolov argues ‘Similar like the UK, France too, chose to have a passive 
view by which the West should not interfere too much in Yugoslavia’ (Marolov, 2012). To 
sum up, the European views and interests on the Balkan wars were different, which could 
not result in a common foreign policy of the EU towards the Yugoslavian issue. The only 
common position taken by the EC/EU was ignorance of the issue, which made the 
European Union inactive to prevent the war from accelerating. This resulted in huge failure 
and tragedy in the European Union history.  This can be demonstrated in the words of the 
then European Commission president of the time, Jacques Delors ‘I see in the Yugoslav 
tragedy the proof that Europe does not exist as a foreign policy actor’ (as cited in Marolov, 
2012).  
In addition to the disagreements among the European states, the lack of instruments is 
the other reason why the Europeans were unable to halt the conflicts. Even though the 
European Community at the time presented many negotiations offers to the conflicting 
parties, it was not capable of convincing each party. The soft power the EC had at the time 
was not enough to stop accelerating of the conflicts and when there was bloodshed in the 
European continent, the EC had not the military capability to end it. This failure 
demonstrates that the European Community was lack of common foreign and security 
policy in response to the international crises even in its own continent and the 
establishment of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty and even the creation of the position of 
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High Representative with the Amsterdam Treaty could not improve the EU’s position in 
international crises.  
Bosnian and Kosovo crisis demonstrated the fact that the European Union could not 
act as a union once the member states did not speak in a single voice in its foreign affairs. 
Because of the divergent interests of the essential member states about the issue and the 
deficiencies in the European institutions which means the absence of supranational 
authority to deal with foreign issues and absence of capable police forces under the High 
Representative, the European Union could not interfere in the crisis and could not prevent 
the conflict from accelerating and turning into a genocide. The ignorance of the issue and 
viewing it as a ‘Balkan Problem’ by the Europeans resulted in an inaction which made the 
situation worse from day to day. The crises of Bosnia and later of Kosovo clearly showed 
the role of member states of the EC/EU in dealing with international crisis. In other words, 
since the formation of security policy is based on the bargaining between member states i.e. 
unanimous voting is enforced in the Foreign Affairs Council in order to form a policy; the 
EU could not act jointly in the Yugoslavian crisis and actorness of the EU in world affairs 
has been questioned due to this failure. 
Being shocked by this failure and having realized the deficiency in its own 
institutions, the European Union attempted to ameliorate this situation with a declaration. 
In 1998, Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at the time, and Jacques 
Chirac, the French President at the time, issued a joint declaration. The Saint-Malo 
Declaration of 1998 realized the European Union’s inefficiency to respond international 
crises and stimulated the EU to act immediately. It was agreed by the two states’ leaders 
that ‘To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises’ (1998). The need for military means and armed forces at 
the Union level to respond international crises had been apparent to French and British. 
This commenced the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. What was 
lacked in Europe was emphasized in this declaration as ‘Europe needs strengthened armed 
forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and 
competitive European defense industry and technology’ (1998).  The priorities of the 
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European Union in the ESDP was indeed agreed upon firstly at the June 1992, Western 
European Union (WEU). The Petersberg tasks defined the type of the European Union’s 
military action which was expanded and incorporated into Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. 
Originally, the tasks contained three main purposes namely ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ 
(2016). The Treaty of Lisbon expanded these to include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; 
post-conflict stabilization tasks’ (2016). Through this policy configuration, the European 
Union became capable of undertaking military actions and thus became much more 
powerful foreign policy actor in world affairs. The successes, failures, and challenges of the 
EU operations are too beyond of the scope of this thesis.  
As it can be seen from these policy formations, the European Community/European 
Union needed a different kind of policies throughout the time. In this point, for a better 
understanding, there is a necessity to distinguish these policies. First of all, defense policy 
was designated for the European Economic Community afterward of the Second World 
War by the European Defense Community. As it was explained this policy was based on 
collective defense principle as a response to the existent threat of communism. After the 
failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 because of the French rejection of the 
Treaty, the European Union formalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992 
with Maastricht Treaty and developed it by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 as a reaction to 
changing international conjuncture and for sustaining further integration in the Union. 
According to Mix’s statements ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy is based on 
unanimous consensus among the member states. CFSP is a mechanism for adopting 
common principles and guidelines on political and security issues, committing to common 
diplomatic approaches, and undertaking joint actions’ (Mix, 2013). Further integration may 
be feasible under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) presented in the Treaty 
on the European Union. As Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) states 
that 
“The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the 
common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an 
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operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may 
use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention 
and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken 
using capabilities provided by the Member States” (TEU, Art 42, 1992).  
Overall, all these policy formations from the European Defense Community to the 
Common Defense and Security Policy demonstrates that the European Union has 
manifested its incremental willingness to involve in world affairs through institutional 
reforms and revision of the mindset bearing in mind that member states of the Union are 
the most significant players for Union’ acting effectively in world politics. The reforms that 
the European Union has realized since its establishment illustrated that the EU has amended 
and adapted its institutions in accordance with the security threats that it confronts. The 
change in security threats brought about change in security considerations and security 
policies at the Union level.  To sum up, the main conclusion to be drawn from this chapter 
is that even though the European Union has formulated and evolved its policies in order to 
deal with foreign and security matters, the process of very integration, i.e. the fact that the 
European Union was established on the basis of economic relationships in the first stage, is 
not convenient and sufficient to establish common foreign and security policy.  
The European Union has continued to accommodate itself and its policies to the 
newly emerged security threat, Jihadist terrorism, in the turn of the new century as well. 
This creates a need for deep analysis of precautions and policies adopted by the Union. In 
this context, the main subject matter of the next chapter will be the threat of terrorism, 
particularly Jihadist terrorism, from the European Union. Together with the evolving trend 
of terrorist attacks that the EU confronts, the major terrorist attacks and the European 
Community/European Union responses to deal with this threat before the 9/11 attacks will 
be analyzed. Furthermore, the two historic moments in terms of terrorism in the EU’s 
history, – Madrid and London bombings – will be studied as a case study in order to 
understand the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy which was introduced in 2005 
in order to combat terrorism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
TERRORISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The perception of security has changed and broadened with the turn of the 21st 
century. Conventional security threats yield to new threats which become more influential 
because of the globalization. Therefore, security policies have to be reformed in accordance 
with the threats in the globalized world. One of the most significant threats is terrorism 
which did not emerge by the globalization but it has evolved with globalization and caused 
much more insecurity in the world. The most fundamental incident that has made terrorism 
a threat to the world was the September 11 attacks happened in 2001 in the US. By these 
attacks, the mindset of sovereign states and international organization about terrorism has 
been altered so did have the policies to combat terrorism. For the purposes of this thesis, 
terrorist attacks that the European Union has witnessed, and policies regarding terrorism 
adopted by the European Union will be elaborated in this chapter. In order to realize this 
objective, it is needed to bear in mind the fact that terrorism is not a newly emerged threat 
affecting the Europeans but its root causes, scope, impact, and results have changed by the 
9/11 attacks. For a better understanding of the subject matter, a brief analysis of terrorism 
and the European Union’s responses before the 9/11 attacks would be presented in the next 
section.  
 
3.1. Types of terrorism and the European Union 
Terrorism has threatened Europeans for many years but it had been considered as a 
national security problem since its causes and impacts necessitated viewing it in that way. 
Throughout history, terrorism has evolved and it has eventually become capable of drawing 
international attention in order to combat it. Before analyzing the terrorism confronted in 
the globalized world, it is necessary to explain the types of terrorism that the Europeans 
have witnessed throughout the history. The information provided in this part of the thesis 
relies on the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report(s) (TE-SAT) which 
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have been published annually since 2007. TE-SAT is an EU report which 'aims at providing 
an overview of the situation in the EU rather than describing the situation in individual 
member states. It seeks to establish basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks, 
arrests, and activities in the EU' (TE-SAT, 2008, pp.6). Through collecting information 
from member states, Europol publishes the report once a year covering the information of 
the previous year.  These reports provide the information on the trends of terrorist 
activities, the number of terrorist attacks both failed and completed, and the number of 
arrests together with the number of persons killed and injured.  Types of terrorist activities 
are ranged under five headings: Islamist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist 
terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, and single issue 
terrorism. Before explaining each type of terrorism, it is necessary to note that Islamist 
terrorism has been replaced with religiously inspired terrorism with TE-SAT 2012. First, 
religiously inspired terrorism is motivated by religion for justification of the acts. Second, 
the motivation of separatist terrorism is to be recognized, i.e. self-determination, 
nationalism, and ethnicity such as the IRA and the PKK. Third, in left-wing terrorism, the 
aim is to change political, economic and social structure through the usage of the Leninist-
Marxist ideology. Fourth, right-wing terrorism shares the same goal with left-wing 
terrorism; however, their ideology depends on an extremist-rightist model. Finally, single 
issue terrorism seeks to change a particular issue which is often related to animal rights and 
environmental protection. Even though the European countries have witnessed different 
types of terrorism in the European soil the fact that terrorism has evolved through time in a 
clear manner from left-wing separatist terrorism to religiously inspired terrorism is beyond 
doubt. 
 
3.1.1. Evolving Trend of Terrorism 
To demonstrate how the threat of terror has evolved in Europe throughout the history, 
the situation in 2007 and 2014 will be compared in this section by the information provided 
by TE-SAT reports. According to the chart provided in TE-SAT 2008, 532 of 583 failed, 
foiled and executed terrorist activities were carried out by separatist terrorist groups mainly 
in France and Spain in 2007. Only 4 of the all terrorist activities were related with Islamist 
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Groups (TE-SAT, 2008, pp. 10). The attacks of separatist terrorist groups were claimed by 
the Basque and Corsican separatist terrorism. The main aim was to bring indiscriminate 
mass casualties. On the other hand, the situation of 2014 is different compared to that of 
2007. The main threat has been coming from not separatist groups which are decreasing in 
number and scale, but from the jihadists who can easily cross borders and increase their 
capabilities to attack. According to the chart provided in TE-SAT 2015, the number of 
attacks of separatist terrorists decreased from 160 in 2010 to 67 in 2014. (TE-SAT, 2015, 
pp. 26). The report provides also a chart showing a significant increase in the number of 
arrests for religiously inspired terrorism, from 179 in 2010 to 395 in 2014. (TE-SAT, 2015, 
pp. 19). 188 of the arrests took place in France. Al-Qaeda has been replaced by Islamic 
State (IS) as the main threat whose network and capabilities are growing. Thus, in recent 
years, IS is posing a greater threat for the EU member states by recruiting people from 
various countries and attracting home-grown people to participate in terrorist activities. 
Contrary to this, left-wing terrorism has been in decline from 21 attacks in 2007 (TE-SAT, 
2008, pp.37) to 13 attacks in 2014 (TE-SAT, 2015, pp.30). Furthermore, the course of 
terrorist activities has been also evolving. For instance, the type of attacks has been 
expanding from arson, small fire arms to suicide bombings, explosives and even to the 
threat of the involvement of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
substances. Increasing usage of Internet and social media facilitate for terrorist groups 
targeting certain audiences and then to recruit them. Involvement of home-grown people in 
the EU, younger population and women in terrorist activities is another dimension of the 
evolving terrorism in the new century. In this evolution of terrorism in Europe, the 9/11 as 
a turning point in history has to be emphasized. Indeed, one of the objectives of this thesis 
is to illustrate the importance of the 9/11 in the history of terrorism. In order to better 
understand the issue, certain incidents will be chosen to be examined before and after the 
9/11 in the next section.  
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3.2. Major Terrorist Attacks in the European Economic Community/the European 
Union before the 9/11 attacks 
 
The incidents provided in this section have an intention to give example to existing 
types of terrorist attacks before the 9/1 in Europe. For this reason, unique cases will be 
chosen which are intriguing and have a significant effect in the venue of the incident. Early 
years of the EEC/EU experienced major terrorist attacks in Italy. On 12 December 1969, 
the Ordine Nuovo (New Order) which was a far right political organization placed a bomb 
in 'Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura in Rome killing 16 and injuring 90 people' (Willan, 
2001). 'Their aim was to prevent the country falling into the hands of the left -wing by 
duping the public into believing the bombings were part of a communist insurgency' 
(BBC). On 5-6 September 1972, Germany witnessed significant terrorist attack during the 
1972 Summer Olympics in Munich. The attack was claimed by the Black September 
Organization which was a Palestinian terrorist organization. The terrorists had taken 
hostage Israeli athletetes and coaches and killed 11 Israeli people. Italy had continued to 
witness a right-wing extremist terrorist attack by the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (Armed 
Revolutionary Nuclei) in 1980 in Bologna resulting in the killing of 85 and of injuring 
more than 200 people. On the other hand, Spain has mostly experienced separatist terrorist 
attacks. For instance, the Basque separatist organization ETA was responsible for the car 
bombing in 1980 in Barcelona killing 15 people and wounding 39 (1987, NY Times). In 
2002, Finland also experienced a terrorist attack. The attack that was believed to be 
committed by a 19-year-old chemistry student, Petri Gerdt, was realized in a shopping mall 
killing 7 people and injuring many (Lyall, 2002, NY Times). A connection to any 
international terrorist organization could not be found.  
These terrorist incidents have various roots and they are different than the terrorist 
activities which the world is familiar with today in terms of the actors, motivations, target 
groups and weapons being used. Hence, they did not arouse the necessary attention at the 
community/union level in order to fight against terrorism. Furthermore, in the first years of 
its establishment, the Community gave slight importance to security issues and terrorism 
was left to national sphere given the fact that the Community was mostly focused on 
 28 
economic integration in the early years. For this reason, the measures adopted by the 
European Economic Community/European Union remained superficial. 
 
3.3. The European Union Responses to Terrorism before the 9/11 attacks 
Before the 9/11, terrorism in the EEC/EU was not so apparent that the reactions given 
to the attacks did not draw attention at the Community level. Indeed, the first attempt to 
combat terrorism was implemented under the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. The 
TREVI group was created in 1975 in order to combat terrorism and it met for the first time 
in 1976 at ministerial level. The objective was to cooperate in the exchange of information 
regarding terrorist threat (Council of the European Union, 2005). In this framework which 
was coordinated under the JHA pillar, the Home Affairs and/or Justice Minister of the 
Member State came together to create counter terrorism and policing in the EC. Later on, 
the ministers accompanied by the senior police and security service officials at these 
meetings. In this framework, the TREVI I was responsible for counter-terrorism measures; 
TREVI II was responsible for police cooperation; TREVI III was responsible for the fight 
against international crime and TREVI 1992 was responsible for the abolition of borders 
(Council of the European Union, 2005).  This was the ad hoc intergovernmental 
cooperation which conducted its works beyond the scope of the Treaties. The TREVI 
Group lasted until 1992 at it was formalized as part of the JHA pillar by the Maastricht 
Treaty. Overall, the first attempt to organize counter-terrorism policy was realized on the 
basis of intergovernmental principles among the ministers of Member States which 
demonstrate that the European Commission had no role in creating and coordinating terror 
policies in the EC.  
Further measures to combat terrorism were taken by the Council of Europe in 1977. 
The Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
in 1977 for the purposes of extradition between states and to abandon the principle that 
extradition can be refused if the offense is political or is politically motivated. However, the 
Convention has loop holes. For example, the Convention enables states the right to refuse 
extradition if it views offense as a political offense under Article 13 (Art.13, 1977). This 
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deficiency was remedied by the European Union in 1996 by the EU Convention on 
Extradition. Article 5 provides 'no offense may be regarded by the requested Member State 
as a political offense, as an offense connected with a political offense or an offense inspired 
by political motives' (Art.5, 1996). Another measure was taken in 1998 when the European 
Union established the European Judicial Network. As it is described in the official website 
of the EU, its main role is 'to facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the 
EU Member States, particularly in actions to combat forms of serious crime' (About EJN). 
It made easier to process judicial requests by one member state to another. Furthermore, 
hearing by videoconference (Art.10) or telephone conference (Art.11) and request of 
interception of telecommunications (Art.18) were made possible through the EU 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000). By additional protocol to 
this Convention, member states are obliged to provide information on banking transactions 
and bank accounts and to monitor banking transactions in 2001. 
 
3.4. Historic Moments in Europe 
Having experienced different types of terrorism, the Europeans have been in an effort 
to minimize the terrorist activities in the continent. Until the 9/11 attacks, the measures 
adopted by the EU, as observed above, remained mainly superficial and intergovernmental. 
No concrete and binding policy were adopted by the European Union until terrorism has 
become a threat to the world by the September 9/11 attacks. Since then, the European 
Union entered a different phase of collaboration with the other world powers to combat 
terrorism. In order to fight against terrorism, the EU decided to adopt new security 
strategies and enhance the cooperation among the member states. Before analyzing the 
policies and decisions adopted by the EU after the 9/11 attacks, there are two historic 
moments in the European history that need to be explained in detail in order for a better 
understanding of the Europeans endeavors to combat terrorism in its territory. These 
historic incidents which would be analyzed in the following parts of this thesis are the 
Madrid and London bombings taking place in 2004 and in 2005 respectively.  
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3.4.1. Madrid attacks 
The threat of terrorism evolved by the September 11 attacks in the new century. As 
the TE-SAT reports demonstrate the activities of old terrorism diminished in number while 
the new terrorism based on religious reasons is becoming much more influential and 
threatening in Europe. One of the most fundamental incidents illustrating this threat is the 
Madrid bombings in 2004. Terrorism hit Europe in the middle of 2004 which led to the 
emergence of awareness about the threat of terrorism among Europeans. The attacks took 
place on the morning of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, known as 11-M in Spain, just three days 
before the general elections, when terrorists exploded 10 bombs which were placed on four 
trains. All four trains were traveling on the same line and the explosions occurred in the 
rush hours of the morning because so many people were using the trains for going to work. 
The civilian population was targeted by the terrorists. The number of casualties is 
breathtaking since the blasts killed 191 and wounded 1,841 (BBC). These attacks shocked 
both the Spanish and other Europeans since ‘It was the worst Islamist terrorist attack in 
European history’ (Camilos, 2007). Once the general elections ended up with the defeat of 
the popular party by the socialist party, the leader of the conservative popular party, José 
María Aznar, argued that the attacks were organized by the Basque separatist group ETA. 
However, the police investigation found no evidence linked to the ETA. Indeed, it is also 
stated by Camilos that ‘The bombings were carried out by a group of young men, mostly 
from north Africa, who was, according to prosecutors, inspired by a tract on an al-Qaida-
affiliated website that called for attacks on Spain’ (2007). The motives for the attacks were 
ambiguous at the time. One possible reason for the attacks would be the deployment of 
some Spanish troops in Iraq. However, this reason could be removed since further bombs 
were found later on between Madrid and Seville even after the victorious Socialist Part 
withdrew the troops from Iraq. Another possible motivation would be the thoughts and will 
of fundamental Islamists as Camilos said ‘For many Islamist fundamentalists, there is a 
need to recover the former Muslim lands of "al-Andalus" from Spain, which was taken by 
Christian armies in 1492’ (2007). Some of the suspected terrorists including the 
mastermind of the attacks, Serhane Ben Abdelmajid and Jamal Ahmidan, blew themselves 
up while destroying the evidence with them when they were surrounded by the police. 
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Despite the most Spanish beliefs and media manipulation, the investigation found no clear 
evidence and link that the attacks included the Al-Qaida leadership.  
Even though there was no evidence linking these attacks with the Al-Qaida, the 
motivation for the attacks were clearly religious given the fact that radicalized young men 
who were North-African origin carried out the attacks. For these reasons, the attacks 
provoked reactions among the Spanish and other Europeans. Spaniards organized 
demonstrations on the streets against terrorism and also the government because of the lack 
of information. The attacks got attention at international level too. Many state leaders 
presented their condolences to Spain and condemned the attacks.  Despite being 
disappointed later by the decision of the new Spanish government on withdrawal of the 
Spanish troops from Iraq, the US President George W. Bush declared his condolences by 
saying that 
“We stand strongly with the people of Spain. I appreciate so very much the 
Spanish government's fight against terror, their resolute stand against terrorist 
organizations like Eta. And the United States stands with them. And today we 
ask God's blessings on those who suffer in the great country of Spain” (BBC, 
2004). 
The European Union also expressed the grief that they shared with the Spanish. The 
president of the European Commission at the time Romano Prodi stated that 
“I'm here to express our deep grief at this bloody, ferocious and senseless 
attack. There is no justification whatsoever behind which the authors of this 
bestial crime can hide. This is violence without an object, without sense against 
which the entire international community has to mobilize itself. All the peoples 
of Europe are now close to Spain” (BBC, 2004). 
Furthermore, the president of the European Parliament Pat Cox referred to the attacks 
as ‘outrageous, unjustified, unjustifiable and declaration of a war on democracy’ (BBC, 
2004). Similar to other state leaders’ explanations, the European Union also condemned the 
attacks and called for further cooperation both in Europe and in the world in order to 
combat terrorism. The European Union not only expressed its deep grief verbally but also 
decided to take a policy action to fight against terrorism. In order to better understand the 
policies adopted for combatting terrorism, another historic moment in the European history 
needs to be analyzed in detail which is the London bombings in 2005. 
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3.4.2. London attacks 
Not having recovered from the shock of the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, 
Europe was hit by another terrorist attacks in July of 2005. The attacks which are also 
referred to as the 7/7 were a series of organized terrorist suicide bomb attacks in London. 
Similar to Madrid attacks, the target group was civilian population since terrorists chose 
again public transportation, London Underground, and the rush hours of the morning of 7th 
of July. Terrorists brought terror to London by ‘killing 52 people and injuring hundreds 
more’ (BBC, 2015). The attacks were referred to as that ‘It was the worst single terrorist 
atrocity on British soil’ (BBC, 2015). Three of the four terrorists detonated their bombs on 
underground trains and one of them selected a bus to explode his bomb. Three of the 
perpetrators were British-born sons of Pakistani immigrants, namely Hasib Hussain aged 
18, Mohammad Sidique Khan aged 30, Shehzad Tanweer aged 22. The other perpetrator, 
Germaine Lindsay, aged 19, was a Jamaican born Muslim. An intriguing note needs to be 
mentioned here that the youngest bomber, Hussain, ‘raised concern among his teachers 
when shortly after the 9/11 attacks he passed two fellow pupils a note which said "You're 
next" in a reference to the terrorist atrocities in the US’ (BBC, 2015). The most threatening 
feature of the attacks is that all four perpetrators grew up in Britain. These people were 
radicalized in Britain, which led to the emergence of the feeling among the British that the 
danger was coming from inside of Britain. Apparently, the underlying reason for the attacks 
was the radicalized Islam as the motivation for the attacks was described in a videotape 
made by one of the terrorists calling himself ‘soldier’ and released in September 2005. He 
stated that 
“…I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our 
driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has 
to offer. Our religion is Islam - obedience to the one true God, Allah, and 
following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad. This is 
how our ethical stances are dictated… Until we feel security, you will be our 
targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment, and torture of 
my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now 
you too will taste the reality of this situation” (BBC, 2005).  
As it can be observed from the videotape of Mohammed Sidique Khan, the 
motivation for the attacks was the perception of ‘us vs them’ among radicalized Islamist 
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people. They demanded the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and Iraq and cessation 
of military finance and assistance to America and Israel from the British government. 
Another videotape that was released one year after the attacks included statements of 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida's second in command (guardian, 2006). Therefore, the link to 
the Al-Qaida terrorist organization, at least to its ideology, became much more apparent 
with these videotape releases. Similar to the Madrid bombings, the London bombings drew 
attention and caused a reaction at the international level. Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan emphasized the cooperation in combating terrorism by saying that  
“We have always stressed that the fight against terror is something we all have 
to join into together. I believe especially that our mutual intelligence 
organizations need to pool their information and knowledge to be better able to 
support one another against attacks of this kind” (Hurriyet daily news, 2005).  
Furthermore, the European Union High Representative Javier Solana stated that ‘A 
terrible event can happen at any time. We cannot let down our guard. We are working every 
day, and in a coordinated way in all the EU countries. Unfortunately, there are times when 
one cannot prevent one [an attack] happening’ (BBC, 2005). 
Besides national measures adopted by Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom at the time, the European Union decided to adopt new strategies to prevent 
terrorist activities in Europe. The reason for emphasizing only world reactions to the 
terrorist attacks in Madrid and London is that the policies and strategies adopted by the 
European Union after the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid and London bombings would be 
analyzed in detail in the following section of this thesis.  
 
3.5.  The European Union Responses to Terrorism after the 9/11 attacks 
Before analyzing the strategy of the European Union, there is a need for explaining 
the endeavors of the Union to ameliorate its institutions to combat terrorism after the 
September 11 attacks in the US. With the attacks of 9/11 in the US, the threat of terrorism 
widened from national, regional to international level. The world was shocked by the 
attacks and the European Union convened extraordinarily after the attacks because of the 
urgency of the issue. The result was the initiation of the EU Commission. 
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COM(2001)521final Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism 
was issued with the intention ‘to establish minimum rules relating to the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and to penalties for natural and legal persons who have 
committed or are liable for terrorist offences which reflect the seriousness of such offenses’ 
(Art. 1) 
Furthermore, Influenced by the scale and scope of the attack in the USA, the 
European Union decided to establish Eurojust by the decision of 2002/187/JHA under the 
JHA pillar. In the official website of the Eurojust, it is said that 
“Eurojust stimulates and improves the coordination of investigations and 
prosecutions between the competent authorities of the Member States and 
improves the cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member 
States, in particular by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal 
assistance and the implementation of extradition requests” 
(Eurojust,eurojust.europa.eu) 
To further complement this cooperation, the European Union created the European 
Arrest Warrant Arrest (EAW) in 2002 (584/JHA, 2002). The definition is provided in the 
Article 1, 1 as: 
“The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State 
with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested 
person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a 
custodial sentence or detention order” (Art.1,1, 584/JHA, 2002). 
The EAW aims to unify already existing extradition procedures into one clear 
document. The EAW was supposed to come into force by 2004 but some member states 
remained reluctant to ratify it since it was formalized under the third pillar in which 
member states can opt out and decision making is realized by unanimous voting. 
The threat of terrorism in the EU has become apparent after the 2004 Madrid 
bombings. Following the Madrid bombings, the European Council adopted the Declaration 
on Combating Terrorism in March 2005. In the Declaration, the EU outlined the general 
situation and called all the instruments at the Union's disposal to fight against terrorism. 
Moreover, this declaration established the position of a Counter Terrorism Coordinator. Mr. 
Gijs de Vries was appointed to the position by the Secretary General/High Representative 
Javier Solana at the time (Art.14, 2004).  The person is responsible for 'coordinating the 
 35 
work of the council in combating terrorism, closely monitoring the implementation of the 
EU-counter terrorism strategy, ensuring the EU plays an active role in fighting terrorism, 
improving communication between the EU and third countries in this area' (Counter-
terrorism Coordinator, consilium). The EU Plan of Action to combat terrorism was added 
as an annex to the Declaration. It put forward seven objectives to combat terrorism: 
“Objective 1: To deepen the international consensus and enhance international 
efforts to combat terrorism, 
Objective 2: To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and other economic 
resources, 
Objective 3: To maximize capacity within EU bodies and Member States to 
detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks, 
Objective 4: To protect the security of international transport and ensure 
effective systems of border control, 
Objective 5: To enhance the capability of the European Union and of Member 
States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack, 
Objective 6: To address the factors which contribute to support for, and 
recruitment into, terrorism, 
Objective 7: To target actions under EU external relations towards priority 
Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating 
terrorism needs to be enhanced” (Annex I). 
 
The July 2005 London bombings have illustrated the deficiency in the EU's anti-
terrorism strategy since the EU could act only after the tragedy had taken place. This 
resulted in an urgent need to create more comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy for the 
EU. Finally, the European Union decided to adopt the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 
November 2005. In order to better understand the deficiencies of the strategy, it needs to be 
explained briefly. 
 
3.5.1. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
When the threat of terrorism has become much more explicit after bombings in 
Madrid and in London, the European Union realized that it had to add value to member 
states' responsibility for combating terrorism. In order to achieve this goal, the Council of 
the European Union adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 30 November 2005. 
The strategy has a 'strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting 
human rights and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, 
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security, and justice' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.2). With this strategy the European Union aims 
to 'strengthen national capabilities, to facilitate European cooperation, to develop collective 
capability and promote international partnership' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.4). This strategy 
has four main pillars which are: prevent, protect, pursue and respond which will be briefly 
explained at this point. 
• Prevent 
Globalization has made it easier to travel to conflict zones, the transfer of money and 
communication through the usage of the Internet and therefore to radicalize and participate 
terrorist activities. The aim in the first step of combating terrorism is to prevent people 
from turning to terrorism. The European Union intends to prevent radicalization and 
recruitment into terrorism. It is needed to 'identify and counter methods, propaganda, and 
conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.7). The 
first pillar, prevent, requires a work at local, national and regional levels to succeed. First of 
all, it is needed to limit people who have a role in the radicalization of people, to prevent 
people from accessing training, to control the usage of the Internet for recruitment and to 
establish a legal framework to prevent incitement and recruitment. Second, because of the 
existing hostility between the West and Islam, the EU must revise and change its policies 
by engaging civil society and faith groups in order to prevent radicalization and to diminish 
the division in the society. Third, the conditions which ease the radicalization of people 
such as economic inequality, insufficient education, and poor governance must be 
reformed. To tackle this issue, the Union must promote democracy, good governance, and 
economic prosperity in member states and in the third countries as well. In this issue, 
cooperation with the third countries and other international organizations gains 
significance. 
• Protect 
The second pillar of the strategy requires collective action of member states and the 
EU institutions. To protect means 'strengthening the defenses of key targets by reducing 
their vulnerability to attack and also by reducing the resulting impact of an attack' 
(14469/4/05 REV4, pp.10). In order to achieve this goal, the EU must enhance control over 
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its external borders; improve its transport security against people coming from the third 
countries. The strategy provides 'Improvements in technology for the capture and exchange 
of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel 
documents, will increase the effectiveness of our border controls and provide greater 
assurance to our citizens' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.10). The Union must establish the Visa 
Information System and the second generation Schengen Information System to guarantee 
the sharing of information among member states. The Infrastructure of the EU Member 
States, such as airports, seaports, must also be protected. Moreover, cooperation with other 
international organizations and the third countries must be established 'on transport 
security, and non-proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
materials and small arms/light weapons. 
• Pursue 
The key policy here is to share information and intelligence between the member 
states. The objectives of this pillar is presented in the strategy by this statement: 'Our 
objectives are to impede terrorists' planning, disrupt their networks and the activities of 
recruiters of terrorism, cut off terrorists' funding and access to attack materials, and bring 
them to justice, while continuing to respect human rights and international law' (14469/4/05 
REV4, pp.12). National capabilities must be strengthened through other member states' 
evaluation of anti-terrorism arrangements. Both Europol and Eurojust is the key to facilitate 
police and judicial cooperation. Furthermore, Joint Investigation Teams are necessary to 
pursue cross-borders investigations. The terrorists' access to weaponry and funding must be 
prevented. In this perspective, legislation concerning money laundering and cash transfers 
must be implemented effectively. Therefore, financial investigations are key parts of 
terrorism investigations. Since terrorism has a global scale, cooperation with international 
organizations such as the UN and with the third countries on sharing information and 
intelligence is an integral part of the pursue level. 
• Respond 
Beyond national response, the EU as a union should be able to respond effectively 
and collectively to any terrorist attack. Civil Protection Mechanism has already been 
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established to seal with crises occurring within and outside the EU. To achieve this goal 
'The development of EU-crisis co-ordination arrangements, supported by the necessary 
operational procedures, will help ensure the coherence of the EU response to terrorist 
attacks' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.15). The strategy suggests the development of a risk based 
approach to capability assessment in order for member states to respond in the event of an 
emergency. The EU database with its list of assets and resources may be complementary to 
member states' responses. Since compensation of the victims of terrorism is an important 
part of the response, member states should ensure this compensation given to the victims. 
Lastly, similar to all the other pillars, improvement of the cooperation with the international 
organizations and third countries on how to respond to any attack or any crisis has real 
importance. Moreover, there is another need to assist EU citizens in the third countries. 
In 2007, Mr. Gijs de Vries resigned from the position of Counter-Terrorism Co-
ordinator and Mr. Gilles de Kerchove was appointed to the position. Later on, the EU 
adopted the Internal Security Strategy in 2010. The second objective of the strategy is to 
prevent terrorism and address radicalization and recruitment. The objective has three action 
plans: 'Empower communities to prevent radicalization and recruitment, cut off terrorists’ 
access to funding and materials and follow their transactions, protect transport' 
(COM/2010/0673). These are some steps to be taken in order to create more secure Europe. 
To achieve these goals, the EU and USA has reached an agreement on the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program (TFTP) in 2010. 'The Agreement significantly strengthens data 
protection guarantees relating to transparency, rights of access, rectification and erasure of 
inaccurate data' (Main Features, europa). Furthermore, the Commission proposed a 
directive for a European Passenger Name Record (PNR) system in 2011. 
“The Directive aims to regulate the transfer from the airlines to the member 
states of PNR data of passengers of international flights, as well as the 
processing of this data by the competent authorities. The directive establishes 
that PNR data collected may only be processed for the prevention, detection, 
investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offenses and serious crime” 
(Consilium). 
In 2011, the Commission launched the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) 
system. 'The Radicalization Awareness Network is an umbrella network connecting people 
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involved in preventing radicalization and violent extremism throughout Europe' (RAN 
Working Groups). 
In spite of all these institutional reforms and policies in order to fight against 
terrorism which has been undertaken by the European Union after the 9/11, the following 
incidents demonstrated that Europe is still vulnerable to terrorist activities and the policies 
adopted by the EU is ineffective in preventing terrorism. The following chapter of this 
thesis will briefly present the literature review which criticizes the EU policies on terrorism 
and illustrates the recent terrorist attacks which occurred in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 
2016 as a proof of vulnerability and European states. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY FORMATIONS IN 
REGARD TO TERRORISM 
 
The former chapters of this thesis have the intention to understand the European 
Union’s evolving policy formations in order for the preservation of the European security 
which has been currently imperiled by the threat of terrorism. It becomes apparent that the 
EEC was established solely because of economic motivations; however, when the 
European Union was formally established in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty, it was not only 
a community with six members but a union with 12 members integrating into further areas 
besides economics. The Community not only has widened in terms of the number of 
member states which has 28 members currently but also has broadened the policies that the 
Union integrates and implements within the scope of its institutions. Besides the economy, 
the European Union has policies on the environment, energy, education, health etc. As it 
can be demonstrated by the analysis done in the preceding chapters, the European 
Community/European Union has made an endeavor to formulate common foreign and 
security policy which would ensure the preservation of the European security. This policy 
formation has evolved in accordance with the threats that the EU confronts. However, as it 
is stated in the preceding chapter, it is not an easy task to react to the security threats and 
the security crises for the Union that was established on the basis of the creation of 
economic policies in the first stage. Hence, the creation of concrete common foreign and 
security policy for the Union could not be realized overnight. Integration into these 
sensitive areas necessitates many years. Indeed comprehensive and complete integration 
did not become reality and effectiveness of the Union CFSP open to question and criticism.  
One of the most significant threats that needs an immediate solution is Jihadist 
terrorism which has influenced Europe since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The European Union 
has designated the policies and reformed its institutions in order to combat terrorism as it is 
explained. This chapter will first present briefly the current literature review on the EU 
policies on terrorism and then illustrates the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels.  
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4.1. Critical Analysis of the European Union Policy to Combat Terrorism 
When the literature is reviewed, it can be seen that most of the scholars seem to be 
skeptical about the effectiveness of the EU policies on combatting terrorism given the fact 
that the European Union has still witnessed the terrorist activities on its own soil. Because 
of the world’s current conjuncture, the existence of the radical terrorist organizations and 
the deficiencies in the EU’s policies and institutions, the European countries are still open 
to the danger of threat. 
The first study which will be examined is done by the SECILE Project. SECILE is an 
EU-funded research project examining the impact, legitimacy, and effectiveness of 
European Union counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) led by the University of Durham. 
After they issued four reports on the impact, legitimacy, and effectiveness of European 
Union CTMs, Statewatch presented a summary of the work describing major concerns on 
counter-terrorism policies of the European Union. The first is about the sheer scope of the 
program which argues that ‘239 measures is far from comprehensive because of the 
exclusion of “operational” and “non-legislative” measures and generalized counter-
terrorism cooperation with third states’ (p.11, SECILE). The second major concern states 
that there may be Counter-Terrorism fatigue in the EU because of the breadth of the 
agenda. The third concern emerges from the first two. It is claimed that EU policies are so 
complicated for its citizens and even for experts to understand what these policies do, 
whether these are properly implemented or not and whether these are effective or not. The 
final concern is expressed as such:  
“The increasing involvement of the security and defense industry in many of 
the security and counter-terrorism policies overseen by the European 
Commission gives rise to concerns about democracy, accountability and undue 
corporate influence over critical issues affecting the fundamental rights of 
everyone in the European Union” (p.13, SECILE).  
The second work that is looked at is the study of the Quaker Council for European 
Affairs. The Quaker Council for European Affairs has been issuing briefing papers which 
outline and evaluate the European Union responses to terrorism since 2005. In their 
Briefing Paper 14a called ‘Law and Policy Framework Developments Since 2005, Relating 
to EU Counter-Terrorism’ (2011), there are certain recommendations for the European 
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Union so that it would ameliorate the policies in regard to terrorism. First of all, it is said 
that ‘[o]fficial documents should make explicit reference to the legal basis for particular 
human rights’ (p.11, 2011). Secondly, they argue that the Prevent pillar of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy is not prioritized in reality. The argument is that ‘[t]he broader aspects 
of prevention, i.e. social, economic and cultural equality and inclusion, are still largely 
neglected or relegated as a problem only in third countries’ (p.11, 2011). Thirdly, criticism 
is made for the rhetoric that the European Union utilized for human rights. It is said that 
‘[r]hetoric that attempts to elevate the human rights of victims above those of perpetrators 
are however unhelpful and incorrect because human rights, by their very definition, are 
fundamentally equal – there can be no hierarchy’ (pp.12, 2011).  
Moreover, the Quaker Council for European Affairs presented the criticism  Amnesty 
International in their Briefing Paper 13 called ‘Evaluating an Evaluation – “The EU 
Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main Achievements and Future Challenges”’ which is analyzing 
mainly the COM (2010)386 which is the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council.  It is said that  
“Whilst Amnesty welcomed the specific references to, and somewhat more 
systematic attempt to include, human rights in COM(2010)386, they suggest 
that human rights analysis is still ad hoc and weak, with gaps regarding the 
impacts of EU and Member States actions in counter-terrorism. Amnesty has 
condemned the weak and non-binding language relating to, for example, non-
stigmatisation and discrimination; there should be explicit reference to the legal 
right to non-discrimination, an area in which the EU has a strong legal basis” 
(p.14, 2011). 
In his book ‘EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?’ Oldrich Bures examined in 
detail the fundamental European Union agencies involved in counter-terrorism and the 
essential legal instruments utilized in counter terrorism. His main conclusion is that 
“The analyses of both relevant scholarly counter-terrorism literature and the 
official EU documents presented in this volume suggest that the EU counter-
terrorism policy has at times been more of a paper tiger than an effective 
counter-terrorism device and its value added in all of the four pillars of the 
EU’s own Counter-Terrorism Strategy is currently somewhere between weak to 
moderate” (p.245, 2011).  
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He also made a reference to the lack of sufficient human rights guarantees (p.206, 
2011) and lack of official publicly available data concerning the actual amounts and types 
of terrorist assets frozen by relevant authorities (p.181, 2011).  
Raphael Bossong in his book ‘The Evolution of Counter Terrorism: European 
Security Policy after the 9/11’ also agreed with Bures by viewing the EU as a paper tiger 
(p.138, 2013). He examined the EU’s cooperation on terrorism before and after the 9/11. 
He focused on the fragmented feature of the EU’s security cooperation and claimed that 
member states would view the EU only as an indirect supportive actor. He concludes by 
saying ‘European cooperation is no panacea to international terrorism’ (p.143, 2013).  
Javier Argomaniz in his book ‘The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, polity and 
policies after 9/11’ looked at the EU’s policies from a different angle: institutionalization 
and consistency. He concluded his work by reaching to the conclusion that there is a 
consistency weakness in the EU’s institutional framework in the fight against terrorism. He 
argues that although the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the 3 pillars structure, the changes it 
brought ‘do nothing to bridge the separation between the external and internal dimensions 
of EU counter-terrorism, since the Union’s CFSP and CSDP remain intergovernmental and 
preserve its separate voting and decision-making methods’ (p.148, 2011), He also criticized 
the European Commission’s reluctance to initiate infringement proceedings against 
member states (p.148-149, 2011).  
Christian Kaunert and Kamil Zwolski in their book called ‘The EU as a Global 
Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA’ analyzed the EU as an 
emerging security actor in many areas such as refugee, non-proliferation, climate security 
and counter-terrorism. Contrary to most of the literature, they concluded that the ‘EU has 
achieved very significant scope of integration and significant capabilities as well as the 
recognition of the most important actor in global politics-US’ (p.114, 2013). They focused 
on the effective policies that the EU has taken such as the European Arrest Warrant, the 
international agreement the EU has made on the exchange of passengers’ data and 
appreciated the Commission’s role and success in taking these policies.  
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In his book ‘EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law’, Cian C 
Murphy discussed European Counter-Terrorism policies in terms of the rule of law. He 
argues that pre-emptive counter-terrorism action has a detrimental effect on the EU’s rule 
of law. It creates diverging implementation routes for different Member States so that the 
power for ECJ to monitor transposition remains limited. He says ‘[t]hough EU pre-emption 
has empowered a wide range of public and private actors, EU action also evidences the 
endurance of state power’ (p.242, 2012). Moreover, he argues similarly to the general view 
in the literature as he points out that ‘[i]n relation to the rule of law’s safeguarding role, the 
pre-emptive approach to counter-terrorism both evaded and eroded the rights of those 
targeted’ (p.242, 2012).  
The literature review demonstrates that the European Union’s policies to combat 
terrorism is an intriguing topic among scholars and once the current threat of terrorism in 
Europe is considered, it is relevant and worth to further exploration. The terrorist attacks 
happening in the midst of Europe since 2015 reveals the concerns about the European 
Union policies to combat terrorism. Since the European security is in peril because of the 
threat of terrorism, recent terrorist attacks need to be examined. 
 
4.2. Recent Terrorist Attacks: Paris and Brussels Attacks 
Recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels demonstrates that how unpredictable 
and inescapable religious terrorism is and how outrageous the results of the attacks are. To 
sustain and preserve Europe’s security has been on the agenda of the European Union since 
both the European citizens and the politicians has incremental anxieties for Europe’s 
security and their own lives. The director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, states in TE-SAT 
report of 2016 that  
“It has become clear that Europe currently faces a shifting and increasing range 
of threats emanating from jihadist groups and individuals. The so-called Islamic 
State has demonstrated its ability to strike at will, at multiple times and at a 
diverse range of targets” (Wainwright, TE-SAT, 2016). 
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The figure above illustrates that religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism remains on an 
upward trajectory in Europe which signals that terrorism would remain as one of the 
greatest security threats for Europe (TE-SAT, 2016, p.23). The increase in the religiously 
inspired terrorism in Europe demonstrated also the failure and ineffectiveness of the 
European policies to combat terrorism. One illustration of the ineffectiveness of the EU 
policies on combating terrorism is Paris attacks realized in 2015. 
 
4.2.1. Paris attacks 
Witte and Morris deliberately chose the title ‘Failure to stop Paris attacks reveals 
fatal flaws at the heart of European Security’ for their article on the Washington Post 
which was published after November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris (Witte et.al, 2015). The 
horror of terror shocked the world because the terrorist attacks in November 2015 in France 
resulted in outrageous causalities. The Jihadists preferred France in 2015 attacking both in 
January and November of that year. This is also demonstrated by TE-SAT report in 2016  
which states that ‘By far the most affected Member State was France, which had to cope 
with losing 148 citizens and seeing more than 350 injured in attacks perpetrated in January 
and November’ (TE-SAT, 2016, p.5). The first terrorist attack in 2015 was realized in 
January. France experienced three days of horror. The incident was identified with the 
French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo. On January 7, in Ile-de-France region, two 
brothers attacked the editorial staff of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo which is known 
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for satiric caricatures about the prophet Mohammad, Islam and Muslims. The terrorists 
killed twelve and wounded eight editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo magazine. The 
perpetrators were born in France to Algerian parents and they were radicalized in a small 
mosque in Paris as TE-SAT report states (TE-SAT, 2016, p. 22). On January 8, another 
terrorist shot an unarmed policewoman and killed her. On January 9, the same attacker took 
four hostages in a supermarket in order for the two brothers to be released and this also 
resulted in the killing of four innocent people. The al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) claimed responsibility for the attack on Charlie Hebdo by a video release in which 
an AQAP commander says ‘It is France that has shared all of America's crimes. It is France 
that has committed crimes in Mali and the Islamic Maghreb. It is France that supports the 
annihilation of Muslims in Central Africa in the name of race cleansing’ as CNN authors 
Shoichet and Levs states (Shoihet et. al., 2015, CNN). The evolving threat for the European 
countries in regard to the jihadist terrorism is that the terrorists are not coming from outside 
the Europe. In other words, the threat is grown up inside the continent. Chrisafis says 'All 
three gunmen were French, from the Paris area, raised and radicalized there' (Chrisafis, 
2015, Guardian). The important point is that the European governments are facing a great 
challenge that home-grown, radicalized terrorists create fear and chaos in the European 
societies, which makes the prevention of the terrorist activities difficult for the European 
authorities.    
Jihadist terrorism hit Paris again on November 13, 2015, resulting in terrifying 
causalities. The result is clarified that 'Friday night's deadly attacks in Paris by gunmen and 
suicide bombers hit a concert hall, a major stadium, restaurants, and bars, almost 
simultaneously - leaving at least 129 people dead and hundreds wounded' (2015, BBC). 
The attacks were synchronized which demonstrates clearly that IS targeted public places 
and aimed mass causalities. As TE-SAT report in 2016 states that ‘IS claimed 
responsibility, stating that the attacks were committed in retaliation for French airstrikes on 
IS targets in Syria and Iraq’ (TE-SAT, 2016, p.22). Six different public places were chosen 
by the terrorists. Firstly, terrorists chose Stade de France where there was a football match 
between France and Germany to explode their bombs. The other places targeted by the 
terrorists were restaurants, bars and a concert hall in which European people went for 
amusement in that day. Two perpetrators were arrested and the other nine was killed during 
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the attacks. The attacks were claimed Islamic State and similar to the attacks on Charlie 
Hebdo, perpetrators were also European citizens meaning that they were radicalized in 
Europe and became a threat to Europe. Indeed, this is the way preferred by the jihadists to 
apply in the attacks that they organize. As TE-SAT report express ‘Both the al-Qaeda 
network and IS have called upon Muslims in western countries to perpetrate lone actor 
attacks in their countries of residence’ (TE-SAT, 2016). Both IS and al-Qaeda preferred 
attackers staying in their countries of residence so that they would reduce the risk of 
detection by the authorities. In this way, the terrorist activities become less evitable. 
Because of the terrorist attacks realized in France in 2015, fear and chaos have been created 
in the European societies and hence the European security has been undermined by the 
terrorism. This situation can be illustrated by the TE-SAT report stating that ‘The Paris 
attacks of 13 November 2015 appear to indicate a shift towards a broader strategy of IS to 
intimidate Western audiences, signaling the possibility of more attacks against Member 
States of the EU in the near future’ (TE-SAT, 2016, p.6). In reality, the possibility of 
another attack comes true with the terrorist attack in Brussels.  
 
4.2.2. Brussels attacks  
By its definition, the intention of organizing a terrorist attack is to create fear in the 
society. This is the outcome achieved by the Islamist terrorist organization in Europe by the 
organized attacks in France. TE-SAT report in 2016 summarizes this by stating that ‘The 
attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 represented a clear shift in the intent and 
capability of jihadist terrorists to inflict mass casualties on urban populations designed to 
induce a high state of well-publicized terror’ (TE-SAT, 2016, p.6). The attacks realized in 
the center of the Belgian capital, Brussels, on March 22, 2016 illustrated the failure of the 
European Union to prevent terrorist activities happening on its own soil. In the morning of 
March 22, Europeans heard about the terrorist attack in Brussels international airport, 
Zaventem which resulted in the killing of eleven and wounding of 81 (BBC, 2016). Two 
bombs were detonated by the attackers and the third bomb was prevented from exploding 
by the security forces. Unfortunately, the third explosion was realized in Maelbeek metro 
station during the rush hours in the morning. It was reported that 20 people died and more 
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than 100 had been injured in the blasts (BBC, 2016). Islamic State claimed responsibility 
for the attacks according to the message released on a website. Witte et.al express in their 
article that ‘The message said Belgium was targeted because of its participation in an 
international coalition battling the group in Syria and Iraq’ (Witte et.al., 2016). Another 
significant point needs to be clarified in Brussels bombings. The attacks occurred only a 
few days after the arrest of Salah Abdeslam in Brussels, who was the wanted man of the 
Paris carnage. Hence, it is apparent that there has been a desire of revenge in IS attacks in 
the European Union. Furthermore, the attackers were again suicide bombers which are the 
method applied recently by IS in order to create mass causalities. Islamic State urges its 
supporters to engage in lone actor attacks. TE-SAT report in 2016 expresses that ‘In early 
2015, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani urged the group’s supporters to target the 
“Crusaders” in their countries, “wherever they are found”’ (TE-SAT, 2016). Moreover, in 
accordance with the current trend in jihadist terrorism, the attackers of Brussels massacre 
were also raised in European cities and they were European nationals. This is the real 
danger for European authorities since they have to provide not only prevention of the 
terrorist activities but also radicalism and recruitment of its citizens by terrorist 
organizations. Another crucial factor in the Brussels carnage is the symbolic value of the 
target places. First of all, the first place targeted by jihadists was the airport which hosts 
many tourists and Belgian people trying to travel. The timing of the attack was chosen very 
carefully since it was during the rush hours in the morning. The intention of the terrorist 
organization was explicit to spread fear in public, to cause mass causalities, and to kill 
ordinary European citizens. Furthermore, Maelbeek metro station was close to the 
European institutions. The European Commission headquarters and the Council of the 
European Union are located near to the station. This can be interpreted as that IS hit the 
heart of European unity, in other words, the capital of the European Union and 
demonstrated the capability of bringing terror, fear, and chaos to the midst of Europe. Witte 
et.al summarize this in their article by stating that ‘The latest bloodshed made clear that 
European capitals remain perilously vulnerable despite attempts to dismantle the militant 
network that perpetrated the worst terrorist attack in Paris in generations last November’ 
(Witte et.al. ,2016). Brussels attacks in 2016 have further significance as to demonstrate the 
Union’s failure in preventing the attacks. One of the perpetrators in Brussels attacks, 
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Brahim el-Bakraoui was detained at Turkey-Syria border in July 2015 and deported to 
Netherlands by the Turkish authorities. Although the Turkish government warned the 
Belgian authorities in the sense that Brahim el-Bakroui had ties with the extremist terrorism 
and he was a foreign terrorist fighter, Belgian authorities had not been able to establish any 
ties with terrorism and the authorities in Netherlands released the suspect. Hence, the 
suspect could again pass to Brussels and realize the attacks. In this course of events, it can 
be seen that the information provided Turkey is not processed. Belgian authorities first 
failed to act in accordance with this information. In addition to this, the information is not 
transferred to the European level and so the European Union could not succeed to arrest the 
suspects and prevent the attacks. Therefore, the Brussels attacks illustrated two layers of 
failure in Europe: national and European level. First, national authorities could not act in 
accordance with the intelligence provided by a third party in national boundaries. Second, it 
failed to share with the member states and the authorities of the Union. Furthermore, it is 
observed that the Union had not been able to control its own border and as a result of these 
failures, Europe witnessed the Brussels carnage.  
In Europe, not only France and Belgium were the victims of jihadist terrorism but 
also many other cities in Europe were recently threatened by terrorism. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the other attacks would also be briefly presented.  After Paris and Brussels 
bombings spread the fear and chaos to Europe, France remains to be a target for the 
terrorist organization. On July 14, 2016, Nice was targeted by Islamic State which killed 84 
people and wounded of hundreds of others. BBC summarizes the terror incident by stating 
that ‘Dozens of people were killed, including children, when a lorry ploughed into a large 
crowd watching a fireworks display in Nice to mark the Bastille Day holiday’ (BBC, 2016). 
This grieving attack to French people including children was claimed by Islamic State. On 
July 22, 2016, another terrorist attack occurred in the German city of Munich, which caused 
the death toll of nine, injuring 16 others (Shocihet et.al. 2016, CNN). The attack was 
realized by an 18-year-old German-Iranian gunman opening a fire at a shopping mall. For 
this attack, no terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack and the motivation was 
unknown for the authorities. On July 26, 2016 IS organized another terrorist attack to a 
church in Normandy in France. It was reported that ‘A priest had his throat slit and several 
others were taken hostage after armed men stormed a church in Normandy during morning 
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mass on Tuesday’ (Batchelor, 2016). On December 19, 2016, another capital city of 
Europe, Berlin, was targeted by the terrorist organization. The attack was realized by a 
‘soldier’ of Islamic State and it was reported on BBC that ‘A lorry smashed into a crowded 
Christmas market in central Berlin on 19 December, killing 12 people and injuring 49, 
leaving 18 in a critical condition’ (BBC, 2016). In 2017, Europe has continued to 
experience terrorist activities on its soil. On March 22, 2017 this time religiously inspired 
terrorism targeted Westminster Bridge, near the Houses of Parliament in London. The 
attack was realized by a 52-year-old British man, Khalid Masood, drove a rental car onto 
the pedestrians on the Westminster Bridge which resulted in the killing of four people and 
injuring more others (Spark et.al., 2017, CNN). As it can be understood from the recent 
terror attacks, ramming a car or a lorry into pedestrians was preferred by the attackers to 
bring terror and chaos. Similar to these attacks, the capital of Sweden, Stockholm, 
experienced such attack when Rakhmat Akilov, a failed asylum seeker from Uzbekistan, 
drove a truck down a busy shopping street which caused the death of four people and 
injuring of at least fifteen more according to Foster’s article published on the magazine 
Home of the Daily and Sunday Express (Foster, 2017). The attack was claimed by Islamic 
State which continues to threaten European cities by bringing terror. On May 22, 2017 
terrorists attacked the Manchester Arena when there was a concert. The causalities were 
harrowing as Marshall expressed in her article ‘A bomb attack in Manchester Arena that 
killed 22 people, including children, and injured 59 has been described as the worst terrorist 
incident to hit Britain since the July 7 atrocities’ (Marshall, 2017). The attack was carried 
on by a suicide bomber who was a supporter of Islamic State. Lastly, Britain again 
witnessed the terror in the center of London, at London Bridge on June 3, 2017.  BBC 
reported that ‘There has been a terror attack at London Bridge in the center of London in 
which eight people have died and at least 48 people injured’ (BBC, 2017). Similar to the 
attack in Westminster, three attackers drove a van into pedestrians on London Bridge and 
attacked ordinary British citizens with a knife in a market place.  The terrorist organization 
IS confirmed that it was behind the attack at London Bridge. 
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The map taken by the TE-SAT report in 2017 illustrated the number of suspects 
arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism in the EU Member States in 2016. (TE-
SAT, 2017, p.24). As it can be seen from the attacks explained in the European cities,  
Europe seriously suffers from the danger of terror. In accordance with the analysis provided 
thus far, it is apparent that the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America were the turning 
point for the understanding of terrorism. Since then, religiously inspired terrorism has 
manifested itself in different regions of the world. Jihadist terrorism has been influential in 
European countries, especially in Western Europe, resulting in the killing of many and 
injuring several others. The European Union has launched the European Union Counter 
Terrorism Strategy in 2005 to combat terrorism after the Madrid and London bombings. 
Since then, it has been in the struggle for the amelioration of the policies in order to prevent 
terrorism and to protect its own citizens’ lives. Therefore, the European Union responses to 
this incremental jihadist terrorism need to be briefly conveyed for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
 
4.3. The European Union Responses to the Recent Terrorist Attacks 
Since 2015, the European countries have seen a lot of bloodshed because of the 
terrifying terrorist organization, so called Islamic State. The European Union has failed to 
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prevent the terrorists from organizing attacks and creating terror and chaos in the European 
cities. The danger was indisputably realized by the European authorities and citizens have 
been aware of the horror of terror. Commenced together with the Paris attacks, the 
Europeans have realized the changing security threats for itself given the fact the fragile 
neighborhood opens Europe to the threat of terrorism. TE-SAT report in 2016 summarizes 
the challenges as stating that  
“Recent developments that include the terrorist attacks in Paris, the clear shift 
in IS’ strategy of carrying out special forces style attacks in the international 
environment, and the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters, pose new 
challenges to the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS)” (TE-SAT, 
2016, p.49).  
In order to ensure an effective response to these challenges, the EU has taken the 
necessary actions. To this end, firstly, the EU established the EU internet referral unit (EU 
IRU) in July 2015 under the authority of Europol (consilium.europa). The strategic goals of 
the EU IRU are set out in the EU Internet Referral Unit Year One Report. According to this 
report, one of the core tasks of the EU IRU is ‘effectively countering online radicalization 
and recruitment efforts by terrorists, by strengthening an adaptive referral capability and 
mapping and influencing online terrorist propaganda networks’ (Europol, 2016). The EU 
IRU is only a part of the Europol’s newly established European Counter Terrorism Centre 
(ECTC). In order to better manage the counter terrorism policies, the Europol created the 
ECTC in January 2016 which is defined at Europol’s official website as ‘an operations 
center and hub of expertise that reflects the growing need for the EU to strengthen its 
response to terror’. The focus areas of the ECTC are also clarified at the website as 
‘tackling foreign fighters; sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing 
(through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the Financial Intelligence Unit); 
online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU Internet Referral Unit); illegal 
arms trafficking; international cooperation among counter terrorism authorities’ 
(europol.europa). The ECTC’s main task is to provide investigative support to the Member 
States and this operational information is contributed to the center by the member states 
and third parties.   It aims to further on the European Union’s network to combat terrorism.  
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However, the attacks prove to be unavoidable for Europe as terrorists continue to hit 
Europe in 2016 as well. To strengthen the ways to fight against the Jihadist terror, the 
European Union adopted the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and 
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA in March 2017. After defining what terrorist 
offences are, the Directive sets out the necessary measures that the Member States shall 
ensure in order to combat terrorism as Article 1 of the Directive states  
“This Directive establishes minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist offences, offences related to a 
terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities, as well as measures of 
protection of, and support and assistance to, victims of terrorism” (Art.1, 2017). 
The Directive designates the measurements for the Member States successively in the 
articles. The Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure prevention of 
recruitment for terrorism (Art.6), prevention of providing training of terrorism (Art.7) and 
receiving training of terrorism (Art.8), prevention of traveling for the purpose of terrorism 
(Art.9), prevention of organizing otherwise facilitating travelling for the purpose of 
terrorism (Art.10), prevention of terrorist financing (Art.11). However, by definition, an EU 
directive only sets the aims for all EU countries and it is up to the member states to apply 
the laws into their national legal system. Moreover, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark are not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and are not bound by it.  
Besides the establishment of the EU Internet Referral Unit and of the European 
Counter Terrorism Center in 2016 and the adoption of the Directive on combatting 
terrorism, what the European Union have done to combat terrorism consists of the Council 
conclusions and joint statements of the EU ministers as a response to the terror attacks. To 
exemplify, following the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, justice and home affairs 
ministers in the member states issued a joint statement emphasizing the need for an 
effective response to terrorist attacks. In Riga joint statement, it is stated that  
“It is important to provide a determined response at EU level. The latest events 
have clearly proved the existence of this multidimensional threat involving 
different areas of crime. The necessity and importance of effectively 
coordinated and coherent approach is of the utmost importance. In this regard, a 
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European agenda on Security is needed to address the threats to internal 
security of the EU for the next years” (2015).  
Furthermore, the Council of the EU adopted the Conclusions on preventing violent 
radicalization on November 21, 2016. As the official website of the Council of the EU 
states,  
“The conclusions underline the need to undermine and challenge extremist 
ideologies, counterbalance them by appealing non-violent alternatives, support 
parents, siblings and others in a contact with those young people who were at 
risk of violent radicalization, involve and cooperate with service providers in 
the fight against illegal hate speech online” (consilium.europa). 
Similar to these actions, the Council have taken many actions, however, to illustrate 
all of them is beyond the purposes of this thesis.  
Moreover, as a response to the terrorist attacks, the European Union issued statements 
to condemn the attacks in addition to the condemnations of the individual state leaders. For 
instance, in the Joint Statement of the Heads of State or Government and leaders of the 
European Union and its institutions on the terrorist attacks in Paris, it is stated that ‘The 
European Union is deeply shocked and in mourning after the terrorist attacks in Paris. It is 
an attack against us all. We will face this threat together with all necessary means and 
ruthless determination’ (Statement/6090, 2015). 
Another illustration for condemnation of the EU as an institution, the European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker issued a statement in which he states 
‘It was with great sadness and profound shock that I learnt of the brutal attack 
that struck Manchester…Today we mourn with you. Tomorrow we will work 
side by side with you to fight back against those who seek to destroy our way of 
life. They underestimate ours and your resilience –these cowardly 
attacks will only strengthen our commitment to work together to defeat the 
perpetrators of such vile acts’ (Statement/1434, 2017).  
Not only the EU and the European states but the world powers also condemned the 
terrorist activities in Europe. Following the Nice attacks in 2016, the US President Barack 
Obama was one of the first to call it a "terrorist attack". He said America's "thoughts and 
prayers are with the families and other loved-ones of those killed”’ (As cited in BBC, 
2016). Furthermore, China’s Premier also expressed that "We strongly condemn terrorism 
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of all forms. We express our condolences to the victims and we will fight all kinds of 
terrorism" (as cited in BBC, 2016). In a nutshell, the European states and the rest of the 
world powers have been aware of the danger brought by the Jıhadist terrorism. To fight 
against, to eliminate terror at least to minimize the threat requires cooperation both national 
and international level as it is claimed in the EU Directive on combating terrorism  
“Furthermore, the cross-border nature of terrorism requires a strong coordinated 
response and cooperation within and between the Member States, as well as 
with and among the competent Union agencies and bodies to counter terrorism, 
including Eurojust and Europol… The global character of terrorism necessitates 
an international answer, requiring the Union and its Member States to 
strengthen cooperation with relevant third countries” (Directive (EU) 
2017/541). 
However, the cooperation at the international level could not yet preclude attackers 
from organizing activities to create terror and fear in European societies. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the European Union responses to terrorist activities would also be analyzed 
briefly together with the theoretical explanations.  
 
4.4. The European Union Responses to the Terrorist Attacks: Theoretical 
Explanations 
In this part of the thesis, the policies adopted by the European Union to form a 
coherent security policy and to combat terrorism will be examined in theoretical 
perspective. The theories refer to the theories of the European integration, neo-
functionalism, and inter-governmentalism. Neo-functionalism, which has roots from David 
Mitrany’s functionalist theory, is outlined by Ernst Haas and was influential from the mid-
50s to mid-60s. The theory argues that integration requires political leadership of 
technocrats not of politicians. It claims that integration could take place in limited 
territories contrary to the functionalist theory which was intended to implement globally. 
There are some conditions for countries to involve in this process of integration. First, 
countries should have similar and relatively stable democratic regimes. Secondly, they 
should share common political norms, values, and civic culture. Finally, they should 
embrace the political will to involve the integration process. The conditions are applicable 
for the European countries. In this theoretical perspective, there are two phases of 
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integration: sharing and delegating. Firstly, sharing refers to the fact that states voluntarily 
agree on joint decision and policy making in key areas. Secondly, delegating implies that 
they agree that certain functions are delegated to some other places. Thus, supranational 
institutions have so significant role in this point that integration is driven by them. For the 
European case, the institutions with supranational powers are the European Commission 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Overall, for the neo-functionalist theory, 
the most crucial actors in the European integration are supranational institutions, not states, 
and technocrats, not politicians. 
On the other hand, inter-governmentalist theory, which was developed by Andrew 
Moravcsik and Stanley Hoffman, was influential from the mid-60s to 80s since the 
integration slowed down because of the crisis between the member states. The main 
argument of inter-governmentalism is that it is the member states, not supranational 
institutions that are able to make a decision in community or union level. The decisions are 
the results of bargaining between member states. Moravcsik argues ‘International 
cooperation in the EC is voluntary, in the sense that neither military coercion nor economic 
sanctions are threatened or deployed to force agreement’ (Moravscik, 1993, pp.498). 
Another argument made by inter-governmentalists is that the power of member states at the 
negotiating table is determined by domestic preferences. Domestically shaped political 
actors, head of states and governments, remain important in decision making. Therefore, it 
is not the spill-over effect that creates integration but the bargaining process which may 
result in cooperation when materially calculated benefits overlap. To sum up, inter-
governmentalism argues that it is the member states, their domestic preferences and 
therefore office-seeker politicians are the key to bargaining process for integration contrary 
to neo-functionalism argues. Given the fact that, the two European integration theories have 
different explanations and arguments for the EU integration and the failure of the EU to 
form effective policies to combat terrorism, the question arises ‘To what extent can the EU 
responses to terrorism be explained by the theoretical perspectives: inter-governmentalism 
vs. neo-functionalism?’                                          
As it is explained in the preceding chapters, the European Union has been in struggle 
for the formation of common foreign and security policy. When the Maastricht Treaty 
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created the European Union in 1992, the creation of three pillars structure designed separate 
policy areas. The first pillar, Community pillar, included all economic issues in the 
European Union. It includes all community law representing the supranational side of the 
European Union and the EU institution responsible from this supranational pillar is the 
European Commission. The second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, were to be conducted by inter-governmental 
cooperation method meaning that the joint decisions were to be taken by bargaining of 
member states. Although the Lisbon Treaty abolished the three pillars structure, the 
distinction between the three separate policy areas still remains valid today. Since the threat 
of terrorism is apparent recently in Europe, it is reasonable to ask the question that whether 
there is a coherent common security policy to combat terrorism or not. It is argued by 
Vicere: 
“EU counterterrorism policies suffer the same pitfalls as the broader EU foreign 
and security policy. The most crucial of these stems from the dichotomy around 
which the EU is structured: a supranational side and an intergovernmental one 
characterized by two decision-making processes” (Vicere, 2015).  
Terrorism is apparently a security issue for Europe and thus it is under the second 
pillar. First of all, in order for an EU policy become binding member states, there has to be 
Council regulation. However, there is no EU regulation which binding all member states on 
the issue of combating terrorism. Indeed, Denmark has an opt-out for the common and 
foreign security pillar. In addition to this, the Council Directive (EU) 2017/54 was not 
adopted by Denmark, United Kingdom, and Ireland. Therefore, the national politicians or 
ministries in these countries are not bound by the second pillar policies. 
In order to understand whether the EU policies on terrorism are intergovernmental or 
supranational, the policy initiatives must be considered. The question ‘Is it the Union, i.e. 
Commission, or any member state that initiates the policy for combatting terrorism?’ should 
be answered by analyzing the policy initiatives  
First attempt to combat terrorism and establish cooperation between member states 
was the COM (2001) 521 final on September 19, 2001 immediately after the 9/11. It was 
the Commission which first reacted and took the initiative to combat terrorism and call 
cooperation at the Union level after the 9/11 attacks. 
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Secondly, another initiative to fight against terrorism was to create Eurojust in 2002. 
Its predecessor was pro-Eurojust which was established in 2000 by the initiative of 
Portugal, France, Sweden, and Belgium (eurojust.europa). It has involved judges from the 
national member states for investigating and prosecuting the crimes affecting more than 
two member states. Following the 9/11 attacks in the USA, the focus for the fight against 
terrorism shifted from national/regional to the international context. Therefore, Eurojust 
was established by the Council Decision 2002/187/JHA and the power of Eurojust was 
strengthened by the Council Decision 2009/426/JHA in 2008 (eurojust.europa.eu). The 
initiative for the strengthening of Eurojust was also coming from the member states. It can 
be seen that this policy initiative to combat organized crime and terrorism was taken by the 
Council which includes member states’ ministries. In other words, it is not the European 
Commission but the Council of the European Union, i.e. member states that took the 
initiative and started to combat terrorism after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. 
Thirdly, another attempt to combat terrorism after September 11, 2001 was to create 
the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) which was designed to make it faster to extradite 
suspects from one member states to another. It was again the Council decision which was 
initiated by the member states. However, Tran argues in the article published in Guardian in 
2014 that ‘The UK has a right to opt out of such measures under Protocol 36 of the 2007 
Lisbon treaty’ (Tran, 2014, Guardian). There has been an ongoing debate in the UK to opt-
in the EAW. Tran says: 
“The EAW is one of 35 measures the government is seeking to opt back into 
after having opted out of a raft of more than 100 EU policies relating to justice 
and home affairs last year, when Cameron wrote to the EU council presidency 
to give formal notification of the government’s intention to exercise the block 
opt-out” (Tran, 2014, Guardian). 
As it is seen from the British example, it can be said that to implement and cooperate 
with other member states in the EAW is definitely decided by member states’ own will. 
There is nothing for the Commission to deal with this issue since the institution does not 
have the power to force nation states to implement the rules set out by itself. Therefore, 
decision making for cooperation to combat terrorism by implementing the EAW is also up 
to member states meaning that it can only be achieved through an inter-governmental 
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method of bargaining.  
Fourthly, the bombs in Madrid affected heavily on the EU responses to terrorist 
attacks so that the European Council passed the Declaration on Combating Terrorism on 25 
March 2004 and the institution also introduced a plan of action as an annex defining the 
objectives to fight against terrorism. It created a new post called Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator in order to create better cooperation between member states and the EU 
institutions. This is just a declaration passed by the head of states and governments of the 
European Council. The declarations passed by the European Council have no binding effect 
on member states. The declaration was designed for to create and promote cooperation 
between the member states. It is the Commission that is capable of making binding rules. 
Therefore, it is arguable that to cooperate in order for fighting against the Jihadist terrorism 
also remains inter-governmental, not supranational.  
Furthermore, following the terrorist attacks in July 2005, in London, the Council of 
the European Union adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005. Having four main 
pillars – prevent, protect, pursue, respond—the strategy aims to create further cooperation 
among member states, enhance national capabilities to fight against terrorism. The member 
states’ role is significant in the adoption of this strategy, particularly the United Kingdom. 
The rotating presidency was held by the UK at the time when the EU adopted the strategy 
in 2005. The UK’s role is very significant in the formation of the policies. Rekawek argues: 
“The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, formulated in November 
2005, while the UK held the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, is 
based on the UK’s 2003 CONTEST strategy, and enhances European 
counterterrorism measures through prevention, by aiming to counter terrorism 
at the stage of radicalisation of potential future terrorists. The UK is the leading 
member of the Council of the EU’s working groups on terrorism” (Rekawek, 
2015, pp.2).  
As it can be observed from Rekawek’s statement, the United Kingdom’s role in the 
adoption of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy is undeniable. The strategy 
was first suggested by the government of the UK and it became a concrete policy as a result 
of bargaining and negotiation among heads and states and governments. Without the 
member states’ bargaining process, implementing policies cannot be effective and efficient. 
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In 2010, more comprehensive Internal Security Strategy was adopted for the period 
from 2010 to 2014. It was the result of bargaining between member states and adoption was 
realized by the Council. Since the member states have their own policy of internal security, 
to join the cooperation for internal security at the Union level remain voluntary and thus 
arbitrary for the member states.  
The last terrorist attacks in Paris have complicated the issue of common policy to 
combat terrorism as it can be observed. The member states likely continue to be reluctant to 
cooperate at the Union level since their ultimate goal is to protect their national interests 
and in this case national borders. Because this becomes the sole objective for member 
states, they prefer to act unilaterally or bilaterally in the international area. For instance, it is 
said that ‘European foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini announced on Tuesday 
morning that ministers had agreed to support France, which has intensified bombing raids 
against the terror group's stronghold in Syria and Iraq’ (2015). However, this is not the 
situation where all the EU members agreed to support France militarily. For example, 
German, British, Swedish and Italian governments presented their limited power to support 
France militarily (2015). 
Furthermore, the terrorist attacks occurred in different cities of the European states 
since 2015 has prompted the European Union and this resulted in the creation of new 
policies as it was explained in the preceding section of this chapter. Overall, since the issue 
is one the most important security issues for the states, member states are inclined to favor 
their own national interests and hence it is not an easy task for them to bargain and reach 
consensus on the subject matter. Since this is the situation for Europe, the policies in order 
to fight against terrorism can be framed and be explained only from the theoretical 
perspective of inter-governmentalism although the EU Commission has attempted to 
formulate policies. Despite all of the endeavors the Union has made, the European Union 
open to the horror of terror given the fact that the European Union could not formulate 
effective, coherent and binding policies to combat terrorism.  
To sum up, because of inter-institutional rivalry between the EU institutions i.e. the 
Commission and the Council, to form the EU policies on terrorism, existence of too many 
players in the foreign policy making structure at the Union level, very nature of the 
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intergovernmental policy making in the related area, the European Union could not form 
coherent and effective policies to combat terrorism. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
cross-nature of terrorism necessitates further cooperation not only between the member 
states of the EU but also between the European Union and the third parties.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TURKEY’S PLACE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY CONSIDERATION 
 
Because of the explanations which are provided in the preceding chapter, the Union 
would not have the capabilities to formulate more effective policies to fight against 
terrorism. In order to realize intention to form effective CFSP and CSDP, there has to be 
cross-border cooperation and collaboration between both the member states and the 
international organizations. In the international area, the common intention must be the 
elimination of terrorism when considered the results created by it. However, it would 
become almost impossible to eliminate completely the threat of terror given the fact that 
there are varying interests of countries in the world. Fortunately, the threat would be 
minimized by the creation of effective and efficient security policies. Once the threat of 
terror for Europe is examined, it is observable that Turkey is the most essential country that 
binds the European states with the Middle East in which there can be found extremist 
Islamist ideologies. Given the fact that the Republic of Turkey has been in a fight against 
the terror of PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) for years i.e. the Republic have experience on 
the issue area; there is an urgent need for establishing much stronger ties and promoting 
further cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey. For the 
objectives of this thesis, firstly a brief historical analysis between the two parties will be 
presented. 
  
 
5.1. The European Union and Turkey Relations: A Brief Historical Analysis 
Since the establishment of the European Economic Community with the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 which brought six European countries together namely France, Belgium, 
Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg and the West Germany, the European Economic 
Community has been in a process of both widening and deepening through successive 
treaties so that the community evolved eventually into a union with its 28 members today. 
The policy areas that require both supranational authority of the European Commission and 
intergovernmental cooperation at the Council has expanded throughout time by consecutive 
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enlargements. The scope of the relations that EEC/EU has established with other countries 
has varied in its history. On the one hand, Morocco’s application for membership to the 
European Community was rejected in 1987 (as cited in Briefing No 23, 1998). On the other 
hand, the European Union has found itself while integrating in a pacey manner with the 
Central Eastern European countries after the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1989. In this 
spectrum of varying relations with the other countries, Turkey has an unprecedented 
relationship with the EU.  
The fluctuant and unrivaled relationship between Turkey and the EEC/EU 
commenced once the Republic of Turkey applied for associate membership of the EEC in 
1959. Since then, an ambiguous and differentiated relationship has emerged and still 
continues in different phases between Turkey and the EU. Intermittent nature of this 
relation has been affected by both exogenous and endogenous reasons. The explanatory 
power of this relationship existing between Turkey and the EU requires an extensive 
analysis of security considerations particularly of the EU and an angle which is able to look 
through from a realist perspective.  
An analysis of the relationship between Europe and Turkey in terms of security 
considerations needs to take into account of historical legacy coming from the Ottoman 
Empire. Having a constant relationship with the European countries, the Ottoman Empire 
had found itself engaging in the balance of power politics in the late 18th century. In terms 
of its geography, the Ottoman Empire was included in the most of the major powers’ 
security arrangements including Britain. In this respect, the Empire considered itself as an 
important part of the Western world and continued to reform itself in order to stay in that 
part of the world. This legacy was transformed to the newly established Republic in 1923. 
One of the most essentialist goals for the founding father of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, was to reach the level of contemporary civilization. By contemporary civilization, 
he meant definitely Western world. In order to achieve this goal, the Turkish Republic 
determined its foreign policy so that it became the 13th  member state in the Council of 
Europe in 1949 (mfa.gov.tr) and of NATO in 1952. Having become a member both of the 
Council of Europe and NATO, the Republic demonstrated itself as a committed partner of 
the West by both accepting norms and values of the Western world and being part of 
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Western security arrangement. To complete this goal of remaining as a partner of the 
Western world, the Republic of Turkey applied for the associate membership of the EEC in 
1959 and this was concluded by Ankara Treaty of 1963 which set the basis of relations 
between Turkey and the EEC.  
During the Cold War, all security arrangements for Europe and Turkey were provided 
by NATO. The only security concern that Europeans had to deal with during the Cold War 
was the threat coming from the Soviet Union, the threat of communism. Since the United 
States of America was one of the superpowers during these years and was acting as a big 
brother for Europe both by providing military and economic aid to these countries, Europe 
and Turkey was heavily dependent on NATO and the US. In terms of military security of 
Europe, Turkey became an important partner of the US since it was one of the major 
contributors of military troops to NATO. Furthermore, Turkey was playing a crucial role in 
Europe for preventing the Soviet threat from spreading to Europe by being a buffer zone 
between Europe and the Soviet Union.  
Although the role of Turkey in the Western security considerations began to be 
questioned with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and so with the disappearance of the 
Soviet threat, the crises erupted in the midst of Europe has illustrated that it is not the case. 
When Yugoslavia began to be torn apart by consecutive secessions, the wars between 
Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina frightfully illustrated the absolute weakness of 
the European Union in providing military security in its own continent and realized the fact 
that it needed the help of Turkey while managing these crises. These crises also clarified 
that the European Union has indeed lacked its own military competence and organization 
and that it was dependent on the US and Turkey. Since the realization of this fact, there was 
a clear attempt on the European side to create a separate military organization that would be 
capable of providing security in Europe and is independent of NATO and the US. In order 
to achieve this purpose, the president of France, Jacques Chirac and the prime minister of 
United Kingdom, Tony Blair convened at Saint-Malo Conference in 1998 to make a 
declaration as it is explained in the preceding chapters. Thus, in the leadership of France 
and Britain, the European Union decided to create the European Defense and Security 
Policy. According to Hoghton, Saint-Malo Summit was a response to armed conflict in 
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Kosovo which showed the failure of Europeans to intervene in it (Hogton, 2009). 
Therefore, the Yugoslavian crisis demonstrated not only the EU’s incapability for 
interfering to resolve the crisis in its own soil but also the soft and hard power of the 
Republic of Turkey in assisting Europe in the management of a crisis. The European 
history reflected another crucial moment showing the Turkey’s place and power in the 
security arrangements which requires further analysis.  
 
5.1.1. NATO-EU Cooperation and Turkey 
“Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs a 
stronger, more capable European capacity” said US ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland 
in Paris in 2008 (as cited in Buharalı, 2010).  
Following the Yugoslavian crisis, there emerged urgent need to further NATO-EU 
cooperation for a better response to the world conflicts. To this end, the EU developed a 
framework of cooperation with NATO in order to increase its capabilities and visibility in 
the international arena.  Buharalı summarizes the elements of NATO-EU cooperation as: 
“Berlin+ arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU; 
arrangements for a NATO-EU Strategic Partnership (EU-NATO Declaration on 
ESDP and exchange of letters between Secretary Generals); arrangements 
regarding the involvement of non-EU European allies in the ESDP (Nice 
Implementation Document)” (Buharalı, 2010).  
The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1999 set three standards of NATO-
EU cooperation which is known as 3Ds: ‘The key to a successful initiative is to focus on 
practical military capabilities. Any initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-
making by de-linking ESDI from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid 
discriminating against non-EU members’ (as cited in Hunter, 2002). 
In this framework, Berlin Plus agreement in 2003 which provided strategic 
cooperation between NATO and the EU demonstrated the Turkish role in the western 
policy formation. Berlin Plus agreement refers to the package of agreements between 
NATO and the EU establishing a strategic partnership in crisis management. Berlin Plus 
agreement consists of three main elements as stated in the EU document: ‘EU access to 
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NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and 
capabilities’ (consilium.europa.eu). Another official website of the EU states that the 
agreement allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis 
management operations; improves the working partnership between the EU and NATO, 
ensuring effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in crisis management and 
peace-building operations (eeas.europa.eu). The agreement has the intention to reinforce 
effective consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the two institutions in crisis 
management. It was designed to complement NATO’s security formation in Europe. In 
EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 it was stated that ‘The European 
Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO 
within ESDP’ (2002). This signaled that the European Union has to have the approval of 
non-EU members in the NATO to use NATO assets in the EU-led military operations. In 
this point, non-EU allies’ approval, especially Turkey’s approval for allowing the use of 
NATO assets by the European Union is critical in enhancing NATO-EU strategic 
cooperation. Through this arrangement, Turkey has acquired right to involve in ESDP 
activities. This involvement was critical for Turkey as it is said on the official website of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
“A meaningful level of involvement in ESDP activities, is essential for a non-
EU European Ally like Turkey, particularly given her substantial contributions 
to ESDP activities, as well as the fact that many ESDP activities have been 
undertaken in geographic proximity to Turkey and/or could have potential 
security implications for Turkey” (mfa.gov.tr) 
Unfortunately, the objectives could not been realized given the fact that ‘There has 
only been one EU-led operation which drew on NATO planning expertise and Alliance 
assets and capabilities since 2004, namely Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
which was launched in December 2004 after the conclusion of NATO’s Stabilization force 
in Bosnia (SFOR)’ (Buharalı, 2010). In addition to the concerns on the US side about 
increasing European autonomy in engaging EU-only military operations, the tension 
between Turkey and Cyprus hampered NATO-EU cooperation since Turkey blocked 
Cyprus participation in the cooperation claiming that only those members of EU which are 
also members of NATO and partners in Partnership for Peace. Therefore, Cyprus and Malta 
are outside of NATO-EU cooperation framework. In spite of the EU and Greek insistence 
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on the issue in favor of Cypriot side, Turkey kept vetoing the participation of Cyprus in the 
cooperation. In response to this attitude of Turkey, Cyprus vetoed Turkish membership to 
the European Defense Agency. Lastly, differences in the bureaucratic cultures of NATO 
and the EU impeded NATO-EU cooperation framework. Even though the cooperation did 
not succeed to continue and generate a joint reaction to the world crises, the power and 
capabilities of the Republic of Turkey have been well understood to the European Union. 
 
5.2. Turkey as a Sustainable Ally in Providing Security to Europe 
The fact that the nature of the threat has evolved for Europe’s security following the 
9/11 attacks which revealed the significance of Turkey’s role and power in enhancing 
Europe’s security. Since then, terrorism became the most salient security threat to the 
Western world. As a matter of fact, the terrorist attacks hitting the middle of Europe such as 
Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Paris in 2015, Brussels and Nice in 2016, Manchester and 
London in 2017 demonstrated that the real danger of terrorism threat is based on the 
extremist, Jihadist ideology. These incidents constituted justifiable reasons for the 
European Union to act in a unified way to protect the Union. As the preceding chapters 
explained the European Union has designated policies to take joint action in order to 
prevent any kind of terrorism in its soil. However, the fact that the decision making in 
CFSP and JHA pillar is based on the bargaining between member states and that 
unanimous voting is required for any policy to be implemented in the policy areas makes 
difficult to create effective policies in regard to terrorism. In addition to this fact, member 
states attach importance to their sovereignty as to such significant high politics.  
The terrorist attacks organized in the capital cities of Europe have upset the European 
domestic politics. In the most parts of Europe such as Sweden, Denmark, France and the 
United Kingdom, the disseminative populist sentiments have led to an increase in the 
power of right wing populist parties in domestic politics which have features incompatible 
with the core European values such as equity and freedom. The policy discourse in these 
political parties leads to the emergence of Islamophobia, discrimination against Muslims, 
and social division in Europe. The increase in the power of right wing populist parties, in 
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return, results in the creation of further opposition to the European Union policies since one 
of the common features of these political parties is that they criticize the European Union 
policies and indeed they are against the EU and do not want to be in the. Hence, it is 
observed that the security of the Europe has been militarily challenged by Islamic State on 
the one hand and as a result of this threat, the European Union has been politically 
challenged by the right wing populist parties on the other hand. Therefore, it is concluded 
that the jihadist terrorism not only poses a security threat to Europe but also it causes 
further political threat for Europe. 
 
5.2.1. Convergence of Material Interests: Turkey and the European Union 
Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, one of the centralist goals for the 
Turkish government has been to ally with the Western civilizations. The only European 
institution of which Turkey is not a member of it is the European Union even though 
Turkey demonstrated its willingness to be part of it throughout time. The Turkish Foreign 
Affairs Minister in 2010, Ahmet Davutoglu illustrates the new vision for the country as 
stating ‘Turkey’s foreign-policy objectives and its vision of how to achieve them are very 
clear. Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU 
membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023’ (Davutoglu, 
2010). However, it is observable that Turkey’s relations with the Union have reversed since 
2011 due to various reasons. One of the important reasons is that Turkey is becoming more 
authoritarian under the incumbent government, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). 
The other reason can be identified as Turkey’s changing foreign policy objectives. Contrary 
to the early governments and their secular characteristics, the incumbent government is 
willing to highlight its Islamic characteristic and to become a leading power in the Middle 
East. For instance, one of the JDP representatives, Ismail Kahraman, in the Turkish 
Parliament said ‘We are a Muslim country and so we should have a religious constitution’ 
and called for removal of principle of secularism from the Turkish Constitution, even 
though it led to disagreement even in his party (2016, hurriyetdailynews). Furthermore, the 
EU’s credibility and commitment have diminished in the eyes of Turkish government due 
to the EU’s discriminative attitudes towards Turkey. As a result of these deteriorating 
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relations, the rhetoric of the Turkish government has changed contrary to what Davutoglu 
argued in 2010. The President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently says to EU ‘We'll go our 
way; you go yours’ (as cited in aljazeera.com, 2016) after the EU demands on anti-terror 
measures in exchange for visa-liberalization for Turkey. In spite of all of these reversing 
relations, changing rhetoric, vetoed chapters, reluctant member states, there is a high 
prospect for Turkey and the EU becoming further closer due to the common security threat: 
Jihadist terrorism. As a matter of fact, the European Union needs Turkey in the sense that 
preventing terrorism from hitting Europe. In terms of geography, Turkey has significant 
importance for Europe. It has the capability to provide military security and energy security 
to Europe which can be illustrated by the words of the EU Commissioner, Miguel Arias 
Cañete:  
“Given its strategic location as a transit country in the region, Turkey is a key 
partner for Europe's energy security and diversification. With the launch of the 
High-Level Energy Dialogue, Turkey and the EU are injecting renewed 
political momentum to our energy cooperation. This will lead to concrete 
actions and projects to our mutual benefit” (as cited in the EU Press Release, 
MEX/16/191).  
Terrorism has been the most important security threat to Turkey for many years. 
Given this fact the Turkish state and authorities have been occupied with preventing 
terrorism in its own soil. Because of the various national interests in the geography and 
fragile neighbor of the country, Turkey opens to the horrors of terror unless it would make 
concessions on the issue with other parties which Turkey has been unwilling to do so. For 
this reason, Turkey has developed powerful intelligence agency that is capable of 
preventing possible terrorist attacks although it cannot eliminate the terror in Turkish soil. 
Unfortunately, similar to Europe, Turkey is also targeted by the Jihadist terrorist 
organization, IS which caused deadliest and bloodiest attack in Turkey. The capital city of 
Turkey, Ankara was hit by terrorists on October 10, 2015, which causes killing at least 95 
people and wounding 246 others as Melvin also states in the article published on CNN 
website (Melvin, 2015). Even though IS did not claim responsibility for the attacks, the 
Turkish government singled out IS as responsible from the organizing the attack. Besides 
Ankara, Istanbul was also hit by the terrorist attacks organized in Sultanahmet Square in 
January 2016 as the article in BBC expressed ‘A suspected member of Islamic State (IS) 
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group has killed 10 people, at least eight of them German tourists, in a suicide bomb attack 
in the Turkish city of Istanbul’ (BBC, 2016). Following the attack, German Chancellor 
Angele Merkel made a statement: ‘International terror chooses different locations for its 
attacks but the target is always the same: our free life in free societies... It is precisely this 
freedom and our determination together with our international partners to act against these 
terrorists, that will go on’ (as cited in BBC, 2016). Following any terrorist attack, state 
leaders expressed the need for cooperation in the international area and united action to 
combat terrorism together with the partners. Unfortunately, the measures taken at the 
supranational level are not sufficient and effective enough that terrorist organization has not 
been prevented yet. 
Although currently, the accession is not a priority for both parties due to varying 
reasons, particularly due to Turkish domestic politics, the convergence of material interests 
of the EU and Turkey have the power to transform this unique relationship. These 
convergent material interests include high-security policies in favor of both parties. These 
policies are to prevent terrorism, particularly fight against Jihadist terrorism targeting both 
Europe and Turkey, to provide border security, to end the Syrian civil war, and to manage 
refugee crisis. Furthermore, to act jointly in these sensitive issue areas that both parties 
have given importance has the ability to surpass all the issues of political conditionality, of 
meeting the acquis, and even of the individual vetoes of member states in relations between 
Turkey and the EU. As a result, once the Republic of Turkey become an ally of the 
European Union for the realization of these objectives, the deteriorating relations between 
the two parties would have a chance to ameliorate and the actual strategic partnership 
between Europe and Turkey would be created. Among the common interests, to fight 
against the Jihadist terrorism has utmost priority for the parties because the features of this 
threat necessitate immediate solution. The terror brought by the extremist Islamists causes 
killing and wounding of innocent people at an unexpected time and brings extreme fear and 
chaos to the public. If the terror and the Jihadist terrorist is not precluded and eliminated, 
the weapon technology would be so developed that IS would cause further loss. Therefore, 
both the European Union and Turkey should take a step to cooperate further to combat 
terrorism. In this point, the question ‘To what extent the European Union and Turkey 
cooperate in order to combat terrorism?’ has to be answered. To be able to answer this 
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question, the current challenges that the European Union confronts and the Turkish remedy 
in this perspective would be analyzed in the next section. 
 
5.3. Current challenges for Europe and Turkey’s renewed power 
The preceding chapters of this thesis explained the security threats that the European 
Union has confronted since its establishment. Together with the 9/1 attacks in the US the 
understanding of security and security threat has changed. Since then, terrorism has become 
one the influencing factor for Europe’s security. This is the central theme that this thesis 
presents thus far and it suggests that the European Union must establish further cooperation 
by international partners, especially with Turkey, in order to overcome the challenges 
which affect both the EU and Turkey.  
The most significant area that necessitates further cooperation between the European 
Union and Turkey is to fight against terrorism, Jihadist terrorism, Islamic State. As 
analyzed in detail above, terrorism is one of the greatest challenges posed to Europe 
currently and its counter-terrorism strategy is not sufficient since it cannot any more 
prevent suicide bombers attacking Europe’s capitals and bargaining between member states 
makes difficult to reach a common decision at the Union level. It is apparent that 
combating terrorism requires not only cooperation among the European countries but also 
cooperation with third states at the international level. Cooperation with Turkey in 
preventing terrorist attacks from happening in Europe is fundamental to the EU’s security 
strategies. This can be illustrated by the statements that the leaders of both parties made in 
the summit of November 2015: ‘Regular discussions and cooperation on foreign and 
security policy should be enhanced including on counter-terrorism against the background 
of serious security challenges notably the rising threat of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations’ (consilium.europa.eu). Preventive measures can be taken by establishing 
cooperation between intelligence services, namely Turkish Intelligence Agency and 
European Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN). The best way to prevent suicide 
bombers is to empower the intelligence service of the European Union through enhancing 
tracking and further border control. One of the key aspects of improving the EU’s 
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intelligence agency is to interconnect the member states intelligence service and to work in 
cooperation both in national and supranational level. The Brussels attacks in 2016 
demonstrated the weakness of the EU at this point since there were two layers of failure, 
national and the European. The authorities in Brussels did not succeed to transfer the 
information to the European level. Therefore, it can be concluded that effective channel of 
communication in regard to intelligence must be established between the member states 
and the EU authorities. Furthermore, cooperation at an international layer is so important 
that the European Union needs further information on the terrorist organization by third 
parties. Turkish Intelligence Agency is of critical importance here since Turkey’s 
importance in supplementing Europe’s security is demonstrated in the Brussels attacks. As 
it is explained in Chapter 4, the Turkish authorities had the information on one of the 
perpetrators of the Brussels attack and passed this info to the relevant authorities in 
Belgium as Turkish President Erdogan also explained this by stating that ‘One of the 
Brussels attackers was caught in Turkey in June last year and deported to the Netherlands’ 
(Osborne, 2016). As it can be demonstrated from the statement of Turkish President 
Erdogan, the cooperation between intelligence services of Turkey and the European Union 
has irrevocable importance. Even though the terrorism, especially the terrorism caused by 
Islamic State is hard to be prevented, the cooperation with third countries, especially with 
Turkey, would help EU a lot so that it can more easily check and control the flow of people 
internally and externally. Furthermore, the European Union countries must consider Turkey 
as an important partner to themselves and pay attention to the statements made by the 
Turkish authorities.  
Furthermore, Turkey has significant to Europe in the sense that it is the frontline 
country in the fight against terrorism. Given the fact that EU could not control its borders, 
Turkey is complementary power to control the flow of people from the Middle East to 
Europe. It has the capacity to identify the people crossing borders. In other words, Turkey 
plays a critical role in figuring out whether people have ties with a terrorist organization or 
not. Because of this, Turkey and the EU must engage in further cooperation in controlling 
borders. Once the borders are not controlled and the people are not checked and identified, 
passing to Europe becomes easier for the terrorist which means the threat of terrorism 
would not be minimized. Under these circumstances, the Turkish foreign policy as to 
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Syrian civil war has gained significance. Turkey started open door policy toward Syrian 
refugees in 2011, which allows Syrian refugees enter Turkey freely with their passports. 
Since then Turkey has become the country which welcomed the refugees the most. The 
Prime Minister of 2016, Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that 
“We supported our Syrian brothers who were exposed to cruelty from the first 
day and we continue to support them today. Turkey has kept its doors open to 
all mistreated Syrians since March 2011 without making a distinction between 
their religion, language or ethnic background. As of today, the number of 
Syrian brothers we host in our country has risen to 2.7 million” (as cited in 
trtworld.com, 2016). 
In addition to Davutoğlu’s statement, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
confirmed the policy as saying ‘There are 3 million [refugees] here now. We have to accept 
the people escaping bombs with an open-door policy from now on. The sons of this 
civilization have to do so’ (2016, dailysabah.com). The Turkish authorities continued its 
open door policy and the open door policy has been accompanied by a humanitarian 
discourse regarding the admission and accommodation of the refugees. Turkey evoked the 
international community, the United Nations, and the European Union and asked for help to 
resolve the issue and to ameliorate the living standards of refugees. It is observed that the 
country was the leading country in admitting the refugees by ‘contributing nearly $9 billion 
to humanitarian aid during the ongoing Syrian crisis’ (2016, dailysabah.com).  The Turkish 
foreign policy in regard to Syrian refugees is important to Europe. Due to the Turkey’s 
open door policy toward Syria, controlling the flow of people became harder for 
authorities. When the journey to Europe is analyzed, most of the refugees preferred the 
route from the Eastern Mediterranean and so Turkey. Through Turkey and then Greece, 
refugees are able to reach the Europe although many of them have struggled to stay alive in 
this journey. It is argued that ‘Every day between 1,000 to 2,000 people are landing on 
Greece’s shores, while more than 35,000 people are trapped in the country, unable to travel 
north as a result of border closures’ (Rankin and Oltermann, 2016). As a result of this open 
policy border, Turkey did not have the control its Syrian border as such it did not have the 
information on flowing people. By this means, many foreign fighters passed to Turkey and 
then Europe. Furthermore, it became easier for European nationals, especially young girls, 
to join Islamic State through crossing Turkish border. For instance, it is argued that the two 
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Viennese girls, Samra Kesinovic 17, and 15-year-old Sabina Selimovic, whose parents are 
Bosnian refugees, disappeared in April 2014 after saying that they wanted to fight in Syria 
(Burrows, 2015). As a result of this danger and the terrorist attacks happened in 2015 and 
2016 in Turkey organized by the attackers that crossing freely the border, the Turkish 
authorities decided to abandon the open door policy in 2016 after the readmission deal with 
the EU and build the wall on the Syrian border. Weise also claims that ‘Turkey began 
stepping up its border protection measures in the wake of multiple terror attacks’ (Weise, 
2016).  
Overall, Turkish foreign policy preferences in Syrian civil war affects the European 
Union security arrangements. Thus far, it is argued that Turkey has a critical role in 
complementing Europe’s security from the south-eastern border given the fact that it is a 
front line country that fights in the zones where the so-called Islamic State operates besides 
it is the country identifying the people crossing the borders with its intelligence agency. 
Therefore, the EU and Turkey meet on common ground: fighting against the Jihadist 
terrorism. In order to realize this common interest, it is argued that the European Union 
needs to act jointly with Turkey to be and to feel more secure and both parties must engage 
further cooperation in intelligence and border policy despite the deteriorating relationship 
between the two. This argument will also be supported by the theoretical perspective which 
explains the EU enlargement policy regarding the Republic of Turkey in the next section.   
 
5.4. Rationalist-Utilitarian Model and the Turkish Case 
Once the EEC was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, the founding elites of 
the Community were aware of the fact that the Community would enlarge and include 
further European powers and become a more integrated community. Indeed, the 
Community turned into a union by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 with its 12 members. 
Through widening and deepening processes, the European Union has evolved into an 
economic and political union with its 28 members, today. The unique relationship between 
the EU and Turkey has begun when the Republic of Turkey applied to the EC in 1959, 
which led to the signature of Ankara Treaty in 1963, granting Turkey an associate 
membership. In 1987, the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal applied for full membership to 
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the EC, however, the application was rejected in 1990 due to the EX internal dynamics. 
Although the Turkish government was frustrated with the EU decision in 1997 
Luxembourg Summit in which Turkey was not declared as candidate country contrary to 
the Central Eastern European countries, this decision was reversed in the Helsinki Summit 
of 1999 due to changing preferences of big powers in the EU and Helsinki Summit granted 
Turkey a candidacy status. In order for negotiations to commence, the Turkish government 
had to meet the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria. To this end, the Turkish 
government entered into a reform process and thus the European Commission noted in its 
Progress Report in 2004 that ‘Turkey was sufficiently fulfilling the political aspect of the 
Copenhagen criteria’ (COM(2004)656). As a result of this decision, the accession 
negotiations with Turkey were opened on October 3, 2005. Since then, the accession 
negotiations with Turkey have continued and the nature of the relations has remained 
unique compared to the other candidate countries since the relationship between Turkey 
and the European Union depends on many factors and it has changed a lot throughout the 
history. In order to clarify the argument that the rationalist-utilitarian model also claims that 
the EU must engage in further cooperation with Turkey in security policies as to fight the 
Jihadist terrorism, the Turkish case with the EU in terms of enlargement has to be briefly 
analyzed.  
Rationalist and utilitarian model led by Andrew Moravcsik is examined briefly in 
order to give the assessment of Turkish accession to the EU and to support the argument of 
further Turkey-EU cooperation. According to this theoretical framework, enlargement is a 
foreign policy tool for the EU to promote European stability and security. In other words, 
the main emphasis would be on material and functional interests of the Union and its 
member states. As a result, the first proposition set out in this model is that the material 
benefits and costs of Turkey’s membership will determine the Turkish accession. In order 
to analyze the Turkish accession to the EU with the utility-based model, one needs to 
consider the benefits and costs of Turkey’s membership of the European Union. As 
Muftuler-Bac argued in her article, the areas of impact can be grouped into three: ‘its 
impact on European security, its impact on the EU institutions, and its impact on the EU 
budget and economy’ (Muftuler-Bac, 2008). In terms of security consideration, Turkey has 
both hard and soft power thanks to its military capabilities and secular democracy, being a 
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role model for its region. Turkey has remained as a sustainable ally for the European Union 
during the post-Cold War era in preserving the European security. Moreover, it is key to 
NATO-EU cooperation and important to the EU in providing energy security as it is 
analyzed in the preceding chapters. Turkey’s role in Europe’s security can be illustrated by 
the words of former German President, Joschka Fisher ‘In order for the EU to be more 
powerful and for our children and grandchildren to live in peace, Turkey needs to be a 
member of EU’ (as cited in Muftuler-Bac, 2008).  In terms of economic interests, Turkey 
has a well-functioning market economy, being the 8th largest economy in Europe in 2016 
according to the World Economic Outlook Database (2016). Thanks to its large labor force 
and consumer market, Turkey has the potential to revitalize the market of Europe which is 
aging in terms of population. With regard to economic and security interests of the EU, 
these are the material and functional benefits that the Turkish membership offers. 
Therefore, according to the model, Turkey can be a member of the EU since it benefits 
materially to the Union. However, the situation for Turkey is not so easy that it can be a 
member of the Union overnight. The argument here in this thesis is that Turkey will be 
beneficial to the Union in the sense that it is the key country for Europe in the fight against 
the Jihadist terrorism. Contrary to the accession argument of the model, Turkish 
membership to the Union does not seem to happen in near future due to various reasons 
particularly domestic politics in Turkey under the incumbent government, the relations 
between Turkey and the EU must be much closer and interdependent and further 
cooperation must be established in the areas of security, particularly terrorism.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objectives of this work include attracting the new security threat posed to Europe 
by the Jihadist terrorism; demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the EU policies on 
combating terrorism; revealing the Turkish role and power in the EU security policy 
formation regarding terrorism. These objectives are realized by finding out the answers to 
three research questions that are mentioned in the Introduction.  
Three research questions are addressed and answered in consecutive chapters of this 
thesis. The first research question, ‘To what extent are the European Union policies 
effective?’, is answered by presenting an analysis of the European Union policies to combat 
terrorism and illustrating the recent attacks in Europe in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The 
second research question, ‘To what extent can the European Union responses to terrorism 
be explained by the theoretical perspectives: inter-governmentalism vs. neo-
functionalism?’, is answered with the analysis presented in Chapter 4. The third and last 
research question, ‘To what extent the European Union and Turkey cooperate in order to 
combat terrorism?’, is addressed in Chapter 5 by giving a historical and theoretical analysis 
of relations between the EU and Turkey. Let me now put forth the conclusions that are 
reached in each body chapter of my thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I examined the historical development of the EU with regards to the 
security considerations of the Union. The reason why I chose to start with such an 
examination was to reveal the root cause(s) of the ineffectiveness of the EU policies on 
security, specifically terrorism. It was believed that the reason why the EU policies on 
security proved to be ineffective was that the Union was established as a primarily 
economy-oriented institution, which hindered the development of any promising security 
policy. Although my examination proved this point, it also revealed a second major cause 
of the EU ineffectiveness on security policies. The EU policies on security evolved in 
response to security threat(s) that the Union confronted. As a result of this, the Union was 
not able to develop a comprehensive security policy despite the attempted initiatives 
constituting the second root cause behind the ineffectiveness of the EU policies on security. 
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The 21st century brought a new dimension to the fight against terrorism. The biggest 
threat under terrorism was now the religiously inspired terrorism, affecting the entire globe. 
The 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001 was the turning point in the world which altered the 
understanding of terrorism. Europe was not an exception in this regard. In Chapter 3, I 
discuss this through presenting my analysis made by using the reports prepared and issued 
by TE-SAT. This analysis demonstrates that after the 9/11 the EU realized the threat of 
terrorism necessitated the development of a Union-wise security policy on terrorism given 
the fact that religiously inspired terrorism became a great danger to Europe after the attacks 
in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, respectively. As a result, the EU Counter 
Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2005 is examined in detail as being the first comprehensive 
strategy on terrorism.  
In Chapter 4, I put forward the current literature review which studying the failure of 
the EU in formulating common foreign and security policy. In the light of the information 
provided in the literature, it was claimed that the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 
2016 respectively illustrate the ineffective nature of the EU policies on terrorism. While 
claiming this, my argument was that since the policies regarding terrorism are adopted by 
the bargaining between the Member States on the basis of inter-governmental principles 
such as unanimous voting for the CFSP pillar, the EU does not have the capability to form 
effective common foreign and security policy, particularly towards the religiously inspired 
terrorism. Additionally, the existence of many institutional actors within the EU makes it 
difficult to adopt and implement the policies on terrorism. In short, it was asserted that 
inter-governmentalism and the number of institutional actors hinder the prospect of 
developing a comprehensive and effective security policy at the Union level.  
In Chapter 5, it was proposed Turkey as a remedy to the aforementioned 
ineffectiveness of the EU on preventing terror attacks on its own soil. I argued that the 
Brussels attacks in 2016 proved to be an important indicator of this failure and the need for 
Turkey when it comes to complementing the EU’s security and combating terrorism. The 
two points that were raised in Chapter 5 were that (1) Turkey stands as a front-line country 
for a range of terrorist organizations, most importantly the so called Islamic State which 
carried out the attacks in Paris and Brussels, enabling the country to assist the EU in terms 
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of border controls, and (2) Turkey, based on its experience in fighting terrorism, can 
identify people having ties to the terrorist organization, which we saw in the Brussels 
attacks. As I pointed out earlier, since religiously inspired terrorism affects every corner of 
the world, cooperation will be beneficial to both Turkey and the EU. To do so, the 
proposition was that increasing the already existing intelligence sharing, forming effective 
channels of communication, and issuing notes between Turkey and the EU are crucial. The 
benefits of Turkey in closing off the expectations and capabilities gap already existing in 
the EU in regard to the fight against terrorism were also supported by the rationalist and 
utilitarian model of enlargement as revealed in Chapter 5.  
As a final word, further research on the current obstacles and other policy areas of 
cooperation between Turkey and the EU; on the establishment of the Islamic State based on 
the regional analysis; on the role of supranational institutions of the EU in security policy 
formation is kindly recommended for the academy.  
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